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This thesis shows that current plans for Naval
Aviation Logistics Command Management Information
System for Organizational Maintenance Activities
(NALCOMIS/OMA ) exclude several important data collec-
tion, processing, and reporting activities which
currently take place at squadron maintenance activi-
ties. The importance of these local activities is
demonstrated through interviews with NALCOMIS Phase II
users and squadron maintenance managers. It is also
shown that, although local in nature, these activities
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The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP),
established by the Chief of Naval Operations in 1959,
"provides an integrated system for performing aeronau-
tical equipment maintenance and all related support
functions." [Ref. l:p. 1] It is based upon the concept
that maintenance of Naval aircraft be performed at
three different levels [Ref. l:p. 3-1]:
1. Organizational (O-level),
2. Intermediate (I-level), and
3. Depot (D-level )
.
By assigning maintenance tasks to different levels
according to complexity, better use of resources is
possible. A routine daily repair or inspection, for
example, is best accomplished by personnel assigned to
the organization, or squadron in possession of the
aircraft (O-level). Maintenance which is beyond the
capabilities of the squadron, such as a repair requir-
ing special equipment or training, is handled by the
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (I-
level ) . Even more complex repairs, such as major
overhauls and rework, are performed at the Depot-level.
Due to a growing need for systems of "maintenance
data collection, man-hour accounting, and aircraft
accounting," the naval aviation Maintenance and
Material Management (AV-3M) System was introduced as a
part of the NAMP in 1965 [Ref. l:p. 1]:
The AV-3M System was developed to modernize the
collection of data at the local level and to assist
in the summary of information for reporting purposes.
Limited capacity of both computers and communication
equipment existed in support of AV-3M sites.
Inefficiencies existed within AV-3M for data collec-
tion, data transfer to other systems, and timeliness
of processing; however, the Navy was moving towards
the establishment of a standardized system for coding
logistics data and satisfying. .. reporting require-
ments. [Ref. 2:p. 3]
B. NALCOMIS
In order to alleviate the problems associated with
the manual data collection and reporting methods of AV-
3M, the Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management
Information System (NALCOMIS) project was established
in 1974. NALCOMIS was conceived as
a modern computer system to provide timely and
accurate aircraft maintenance, operations, and
logistics data. These data are to be used in support
of the day-to-day maintenance and supply activities,
as well as to communicate key summary information [up
the chain of command] for management analysis. [Ref.
3:p. 3]
"There are four primary objectives of NALCOMIS,
each of which has a major impact on the mission
capability and overall personnel effectiveness" at the
Organizational and Intermediate Maintenance Activities
and the supply centers which support them [Ref. 2:p.
4]. These four objectives are:
1) Improved Aircraft Mission Capability.
2) Improved Aircraft Maintenance and Supply Support.
3) Improved Reporting to Satisfy Navy and Department
of Defense Program Requirements.
4) Modernized Management Support.
It is estimated that NALCOMIS will require approxi-
mately three million lines of code and will consist of
over twenty-eight hundred programs [Ref. 4]. Due to
the size of NALCOMIS and the complexity of the func-
tions it is to perform, development of NALCOMIS and
release to the fleet is being accomplished in three
phases [Ref. 5:p. 3-1].
Phase I serves as an interim system in support of
Intermediate Maintenance Activities and Supply Support
Centers until NALCOMIS development is completed.
"Phase I provides the aviation maintenance and material
managers with a long awaited automated repairables
management tool." [Ref. 6] Also referred to as
NALCOMIS Repairables Management Module (NRMM), Phase I
has already been implemented at Naval Air Stations,
Marine Aircraft Groups (MAGs), and Aircraft Intermedi-
ate Maintenance Departments (AIMDs) and Supply Support
Centers (SSCs) aboard aircraft carriers.
Phase II provides automated data collection and on-
line data processing capabilities to AIMDs and SSCs.
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"Functional design was completed in September 1985 and
software design and development commenced in August
1985." [Ref. 6] A prototype was installed at MAG- 14
,
MCAS Cherry Point, in October 1986. Implementation of
Phase II at selected AIMD/SSCs is currently in prog-
ress .
Phase III will automate Organizational Maintenance
Activities (OMAs) much as Phase II is automating AIMDs
.
The initial design for Phase III, also called
NALCOMIS/OMA, was completed in September 1986 and
development was begun the following month. By July
1987, however, while NALCOMIS Phases I and II continued
in various stages of implementation and testing,
development of NALCOMIS/OMA wa^ suspended due to end-
of-fiscal-year budgetary constraints.
Also a part of Phase III, NALCOMIS for Detachments
Subsystem (NDS) will provide smaller aviation detach-
ments (e.g., LAMPS and VERTREP detachments) with
management support and automation capabilities. NDS,
currently in the early stages of design, will be a
simplified version of NALCOMTS/OMA.
The Navy Management Systems Support Office, the
designated central design activity for NALCOMIS, has
expressed uncertainty as to the future of Phase III
development. Should NALCOMIS/OMA, as currently
defined, be further developed and tested, or should
NDS, a more streamlined version, become a basic
building block and expanded as necessary to meet the
requirements of larger maintenance activities? Or
should some third alternative should be considered?
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to show that
current plans for NALCOMIS/OMA exclude several impor-
tant data collection, processing, and reporting
activities which currently take place at squadron
maintenance activities. The importance of these local
activities will be demonstrated through interviews with
users of the NALCOMIS Phase II system and squadron
maintenance managers. It will also be shown that,
although local in nature, these activities are vital to
the achievement of the stated objectives of NALCOMIS.
Several of the key development issues involved in
automating the OMA will also be examined:
1) How can NALCOMIS provide management support to
squadron maintenance managers?
2) What can NALCOMIS do at the squadron level to
improve mission capability?
3) Should NALCOMIS/OMA be further developed or should
NDS be expanded to meet the needs of the OMA?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
While NALCOMIS has been divided into phases for
development and implementation, each phase in itself
represents a tremendously complex system. Therefore,
5
the intent of this thesis is not to provide detailed
solutions to the technical issues which remain. It is,
rather, an attempt to examine the big picture of
NALCOMIS/OMA from both the computer systems management
and organizational maintenance perspectives.
Due to time and travel constraints, research on
organizational maintenance activities was conducted at
one geographical site. Because NAMP procedures apply
universally to Naval Aviation activities, it was not
anticipated that this would be a limiting factor in the
study. It was discovered, however, that while NALCOMIS
is designed to support the NAMP, local procedures are
also important. They are, in fact, vital to meeting
the objectives of NALCOMIS. Therefore, conducting
research at only one site did become a limiting factor
in the study.
E. RESEARCH APPROACH
Numerous telephone conversations (commencing in
July 1987) with the Commanding Officer and other Navy
Management and Systems Support Office (NAVMASSO)
personnel revealed that some uncertainties regarding
NALCOMIS/OMA still existed. Since development of this
particular phase of NALCOMIS was temporarily suspended
due to fiscal constraints, it appeared to be a good
time to examine some of these uncertainties.
After conducting an extensive search of publica-
tions dealing with NALCOMIS, it was determined that
personal interviews would be required in order to
establish
:
1) Past and present management philosophies which led
to the current plans for NALCOMIS /OMA
,
2) The major concerns of those who had used Phase II
and NALCOMIS/ OMA prototype systems, and
3) Potential concerns of future users of the system.
The first objective was met through a visit with
NAVMASSO personnel in Norfolk, Virginia. Interviews
were conducted with key individuals who had been
involved with Phase III during its earlier development.
Additional information was obtained during a visit to
former PMA-270 Maintenance Officer, CDR Bob Jaurnig.
Phase II users (and those with experience on a
Phase III partial prototype at Arthur Andersen and
Company), each having a great deal of experience as
aviation maintenance managers, provided valuable
insight into current and anticipated problems with the
system. The author also gained some hands-on experi-
ence with the Phase II system.
Interviews were conducted at a typical organiza-
tional maintenance activity at Naval Air Station
Lemoore, California, in December 1987, to further
determine potential user concerns. These interviews
were not intended to determine how future users would
react to using a computer system, but rather to
document in detail some of the current procedures used
in aviation maintenance. Because some procedures are
local and therefore vary from one organization to the
next, such a local study was felt necessary in order to
determine what sort of flexibility NALCOMIS/OMA should
possess
.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The organization of the remaini~i<c, chapters of this
thesis is as follows:
II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY:
Provides a brief overview of the Organizational
Maintenance Activity and those individuals who will
be using NALCOMIS/OMA.
III. NALCOMIS/OMA: Introduces NALCOMIS/OMA and NDS
.
It also includes a short discussion of some of the
hardware and software constraints placed on the
developers of NALCOMIS.
IV. DEVELOPMENT DECISIONS: Some of the critical
decisions which must be made by those managing the
development of NALCOMIS/OMA are discussed. Current
plans for NALCOMIS/OMA are compared with the overall
objectives of the project. Also, the implications of
expanding NDS to meet the information needs of the
OMA is examined.
V. USER CONCERNS: Contains the results of interviews
conducted with maintenance managers who have gained
experience with the NALCOMIS Phase II system and the
partial prototype which exists at Arthur Andersen and
Company.
VI. NAMP PROCEDURES: Introduces the VIDS/MAF--the
tool used to collect most of the maintenance data in
the squadron. The flow of the VIDS/MAF is traced
through the maintenance organization and some of the
potential benefits of automating the MAF are identi-
fied.
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VII. LOCAL PROCEDURES: Several local management tools
used by maintenance managers are Identified. The
Importance of these tools is related to user's
(bottom-level management's) acceptance of
NALCOMIS/OMA.
VIII. ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE INFORMATION SYSTEM
FOR THE OMA: The attributes of an effective informa-
tion system are applied to the results of the
research contained in chapters IV through VII. By so
doing, the importance of providing the OMA with
local, pertinent, and flexible reporting capabilities
is established.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Presents the
conclusions of the study and makes recommendations
for future actions and further research.
II . THE ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY
While this thesis assumes that most readers have a
fair knowledge of the organizational maintenance
activity ( OMA ) and its functions, a brief overview
should provide unfamiliar readers with some under-
standing as well. Although somewhat simplified, such
an overview should also serve to identify those
individuals at different levels in the organization




The naval aviation squadron is composed of four
departments: Administrative, Operations, Safety, and
Maintenance. Each of the departments is typically
headed by an aviator who is a senior Lieutenant
Commander or junior Commander. These officers periodi-
cally rotate from one department head billet to another
in order to gain the experience necessary to later
become a Commanding Officer. Therefore, the Mainte-
nance Officer, for instance, is involved not only with
the maintenance activities of the squadron but also
with flying and other related duties as well. For this
reason, he is surrounded by individuals who are devoted
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primarily to maintenance— so called maintenance
professionals.
The organization of the Maintenance Department is
shown in Figure 1 [Ref. 7:p. 3-3]. As the lower
portion of the chart indicates, the department is
divided into divisions. Each division, in turn, is
composed of branches. The Avionics/ Armament Division,
for example, consists of those branches which are
concerned with the aircraft's electrical, electronic,
and associated weapons systems. It is these branches
which will commonly be referred to as work centers.
Such a grouping of branches under common divisions has
evolved in order to assure efficient organization of




The Maintenance Officer (MO) is responsible to the
Commanding Officer for all matters concerning the
department. The Assistant Maintenance Officer (AMO),
as the name implies, assists the MO in running the
department. Usually an officer with no flying duties
(ground officer) and designated a full-time maintenance
manager, he has held various positions within the
department in the past. Included among his responsi-
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departments, assignment of maintenance personnel, and
training [Ref. 7:p. 4-7].
Quality Assurance/Analysis (QA/A), headed by the
Quality Assurance Officer, is responsible for the
overall quality of maintenance within the organization.
Included among those programs assigned to QA/A are QA
audits, Central Technical Publications Library, ground
safety, and data trend analysis [Ref. 7:p. 5-11].
Several managers assist the QA Officer in his
duties. The QA Chief Petty Officer ( CPO ) , a senior
enlisted individual with extensive knowledge of
aircraft maintenance, is the QA Officer's right-hand
man with respect to QA matters. Quality Assurance
representatives, in addition to providing technical
guidance in their particular areas of expertise, assist
in the preparation of department maintenance instruc-
tions, certification of production (work center)
personnel, and developing checklists for auditing work
centers and specific maintenance programs [Ref. 7:p. 5-
8]. The QA Analyst provides management with the data
necessary to make decisions with regard to aircraft and
equipment "condition, readiness, and utilization."
[Ref. 7:p. 5-6] Finally, the Central Technical Publica-
tions Librarian maintains those publications pertinent
to that particular maintenance activity.
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Maintenance Administration provides clerical and
administrative services for the department. Such
services include maintaining reports and records for
the department as well as preparing correspondence
which requires executive action or special attention by
the MO or higher authority [Ref. 7:p. 4-11].
Maintenance Control, as its name implies, is at the
heart of the maintenance effort. Headed by the
Maintenance/Material Control Officer, it is the central
point of coordination between work centers. By keeping
the overall picture of aircraft maintenance in mind,
decisions are made about the priority of each job and
which resources to apply to those jobs. A Maintenance
CPO , stationed at the Maintenance Control desk during
each work shift, is the individual primarily charged
with making those decisions.
Material Control consists of aviation storekeepers
who act as points of contact between department
personnel and the supply activity that supports the
squadron. Trained in supply requisition procedures,
they order parts and materials in support of the
maintenance effort and provide department managers with
the status of those requisitions. Material Control
also maintains the squadron's Operating Target ( OPTAR
)
account which consists of those funds from which the
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squadron buys aviation fuels, flight clothing and other
administrative supplies.
The Individual Material Readiness List ( IMRL ) is
also managed by Material Control personnel. The IMRL
manager maintains transfer, receipt, and custody
records of those support equipment items which are in
the squadron's possession.
Each division is headed by a Division Officer and a
Division CPO. Depending on the number of officers and
CPOs available in the squadron, some branches may also
contain a Branch Officer and/or CPO.
Management of the hour-by-hour tasks assigned to
each work center is done by the work center supervisor.
His importance cannot be overemphasized:
If successful accomplishment of assigned tasks could
be attributed to any one group of personnel , it would
be the work center supervisors. Diligent supervision
at the work center level includes rigidly adhering
to ... procedures and policies. To ensure the accom-
plishment of all assigned work, maximum efficiency
must be obtained and maintained in the use of
manpower, material, and facilities. [Ref. 7:p. 9-1]
C. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
While Figure 1 [Ref. 7:p. 3-3] shows the hierarchi-
cal composition of the Maintenance Department, it does
not show the constant exchange of information that
takes place between the various components making up
the department. Because aviation maintenance is a
dynamic activity filled with uncertainty, timely
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communication among those various components is the key
to smooth and efficient operations. As will be shown
later, such communication currently occurs in the OMA
and must occur in any future system if it is to prove
useful to maintenance managers.
In addition to information exchanges within the
Maintenance Department itself, there also exist
exchanges between Maintenance and other departments as
well. Most pertinent to this thesis are the exchanges
which take place between the Maintenance and Operations
Departments. Operations, in its planning and schedul-
ing of flights, must be aware of the maintenance
situation. It must, for instance, know how many
aircraft are available to fly and what, if any,
aircraft subsystem limitations exist.
Maintenance must likewise be aware of the needs and
requirements of operations. It must know not only how
many aircraft are needed, but also what sort of
aircraft subsystems are required to fulfill the
mission, how much fuel is required, what weapons are
needed, etc. Because the maintenance situation is
always changing, both departments must remain in
constant communication with one another.
The OMA also depends on communication with other
organizations. Maintenance personnel must be able to
find out when they can expect replacement parts which
16
have been ordered from the Supply Support Center (SSC).
Also, the OMA must be able to communicate with the
local Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department
(AIMD) so that it knows the status of aircraft com-
ponents which are being repaired at the AIMD.
The exchanges of maintenance and supply information
within the aviation squadron, and among the squadron
and the AIMD/SSC, should be improved by NALCOMIS/OMA
.
Communication among the activities involved in aviation
maintenance should become faster and more efficient
through the use of automated data collection and
processing. NALCOMIS/OMA and its functions will be
discussed in the following chapter.
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Ill . NALCOMIS/OMA
A. GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
NALCOMIS/OMA is seen as a means of achieving
improved mission capability at the squadron level. In
achieving this end, it is proposed by the Navy Manage-
ment Systems Support Office that NALCOMIS will [Ref.
3 : p . 4 ] :
1) Support "a thorough inspection and approval
process... to verify repair completion and determine
material readiness."
2) Assist in "establishing a maintenance schedule by
considering the priorities of available resources
including skills, worker hours, material, and support
equipment .
"
3) Provide an information reporting capability.
4) Provide for the "tracking and controlling of
resources .
5) Reduce administrative burden within the OMA.
NALCOMIS/OMA is to provide such capabilities to
activities both afloat and ashore.
The primary objectives of NALCOMIS are described in
the system's Functional Description [Ref. 3:p. 3]:
1 ) Improved Aircraft Mission Capability. Through
more accurate and timely processing of data, the
organizational levels will be able to better manage
and take action on the information provided by the
system. Delays due to awaiting maintenance (AWM) or
awaiting parts ( AWP ) will be reduced. This will in




Improved Aircraft Maintenance and Supply Support.
Through more accurate and timely information,
maintenance and supply personnel will be able to
improve their overall productivity and available man-
hours. The component turnaround time will be reduced
as a result of faster supply response time and less
time spent on ADP oriented activities. NALCOMIS has
been designed to follow NAMP guidelines for both
supply and maintenance functions.
3 Improved Reporting to Satisfy Navy and Department
of Defense (POD) Program Requirements. The entire
NALCOMIS system will provide interfaces which are
straightforward and automated, requiring little
manual intervention. Data sent [to]...AV-3M and
other naval aviation logistics support systems are
maintained within NALCOMIS to provide timely,
accurate, and complete data in the format acceptable
by each system. The OMA system will provide inter-
faces to AV-3M.
4) Modernized Management Support. The system will
provide comprehensive support of aviation maintenance
and supply functions at the organizational and
intermediate levels, both ashore and afloat. The on-
line, interactive features of NALCOMIS will provide
the needed response time to support daily activities
and provide timely information to local managers and
[other information] systems. Common inputs and
outputs also have been designed throughout the system
to facilitate training activities and ease of use. A
common data base will ensure data control and overall
accuracy and validity of information.
"Standardization of Automated Data Processing (ADP)
hardware and system software was achieved under the
Shipboard Non-tactical ADP Program (SNAP) I, Phase 2."
[Ref. 2:p. 3] The SNAP I minicomputer hardware
targeted for NALCOMIS/OMA consists of [Ref. 3:p. 21]:
1) The central processing unit... a HIS [Honeywell
Information Systems] DPS 6/74 processor with one
megaword (MW) of memory.
2) Storage media for the nondeployable
configuration. . .four 67 megabyte (MB) disk drives
(268 MB of total disk storage). The deployable
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storage media. .. six 50.1 MB Winchester disk drives
(300.6 MB total disk storage).
3) Up to two 300 lines per minute (LPM) printers and
up to three ASPI-34 form printers.
4) One console terminal, fifteen work station
terminals, sixteen 80 characters per second ( CPS
)
screen printers (one attached to each terminal) and
two eight-inch diskette handlers.
A similar hardware environment exists at the IMA/SSC
(NALCOMIS Phase II) level.
NALCOMIS/OMA is being designed such that it will
provide on-line, real time capabilities 22 hours per
day with the remaining two hours reserved for batch and
backup processing:
On-line functions are performed by user personnel
operating keyboard video display terminals (KVDTs)
located in their assigned sections or work centers.
On-line functions allow the immediate entry, update,
or retrieval of information. These on-line functions
are controlled by an on-line monitor. Batch process-
ing functions, which are not controlled by an on-line
monitor, are either queued for immediate processing
or are performed at scheduled periods each day
depending upon the level of system resources required
to complete the batch processing function. Hardcopy
notices, reports, report extracts, data base purge
processing, and data base reorganizations are
examples of batch processing functions [Ref. 8:p. 5].
As developed thus far, NALCOMIS for OMAs is divided
into 10 subsystems [Ref. 3:pp. 8-10]:
1) Data Base Maintenance Subsystem. This subsystem
establishes and maintains the nonvolatile data within
NALCOMIS and performs the necessary local data base
support functions for all subsystems.
2) Flight Activity Subsystem. The major functions
associated with this subsystem include the recording
of aircraft flight utilization data on the Naval
Aircraft Flight Record ...( i . e
.
, the "Yellow Sheet").
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3) Maintenance Activity Subsystem. This subsystem
includes those functions and processes required to
maintain aircraft, engines, and equipment. [It also]
provides the capability to perform fully automated
processing of the Visual Information Display
System/Maintenance Action Form (VIDS/MAF) in accor-
dance with policies described in the NAMP
.
4) Configuration Status Accounting Subsystem. This
subsystem provides the capability to establish and
maintain the configuration profile of aircraft,
aircraft engines, aircraft components, engine modules
and components, support equipment, and support
equipment components.
5) Personnel Management Subsystem. This subsystem
includes the functions necessary to collect and
maintain specific personnel data for both military
and civilian personnel assigned to an organization.
6) Asset Management Subsystem. This subsystem
addresses the management of aircraft and equipment
assigned to an organization. All aircraft and
specific equipment are inventoried and the readiness
status determined and recorded.
7) Local/Upline Reporting Subsystem. This subsystem
provides the capability to capture information
accumulated by the other subsystems, combines and
consolidates that data into detail and summary level
management reports, and extracts the data base
information necessary to satisfy the ... reporting
requirements of the NAMP.
8) System Support Subsystem. Communication between
organizations is also handled by this subsystem
through the maintenance of on-line messages to the
appropriate organization.
9) Data Offload/Onload Subsystem. This subsystem
provides for the offload/onload of data associated
with the transfer/arrival of aircraft, equipment and
personnel
.
10) Technical Publications Subsystem. This subsystem
tracks the location of technical publications owned
by the organization and provides on-line access to
that information.
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Each of the subsystems in NALCOMIS/OMA consists of
on-line screens and conversations. "An on-line screen
is a formatted display of input forms or output data.
An on-line conversation is the collection of screens
required to accomplish a single business function."
[Ref. 8:p. 3]
Each subsystem offers several other output products
to the user. Electronic messages may be sent from one
terminal to another. Printed output, in the form of
notices and reports, is also available. "A notice is a
document printed as a result of an on-line transaction
that requires immediate follow-up action. A report is
a multi-page document containing information for local
and [higher level] management." [Ref. 8:p. 3].
Each of the conversations within NALCOMIS follows
one of five conversation categories [Ref. 3:p. 14]:
1) Data Entry. This conversation is used J;o enter
data on either a single screen or a series of
screens. Depending on the conversation, a mailbox
message, hardcopy notices, or interface record may be
generated. Examples of data entry conversations are
the creation of MAFs
,




This conversation [is used]... to
select the desired record for processing. Depending
on the conversation, a mailbox message, hardcopy
notice, or interface may be generated. Examples of
an update/delete conversation are to update a MAF job
status or to delete a component configuration record.
3) Display. This conversation displays a single
record... No mailbox messages, hardcopy notices, or
interfaces are generated. Example conversations are
to display a specifically identified MAF, material
requirement, or personnel record.
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4) List Display. This conversation displays a list
of specific records... No mailbox messages, hardcopy
notices, or interfaces are generated. Example
conversations are to display information for all open
MAFs for a work center, list all personnel with a
specific SMQ [Special Maintenance Qualification], or
list all material requirements for a MAF.
5) Batch Report Request. This conversation requires
entry of the report identification and data selection
criteria, if required. The report is then produced
during a subsequent process. The report request will
be used to notify the system operator to produce the
proper report. In addition to requested reports, the
system will automatically produce standard batch
reports routinely printed on a daily, weekly,
monthly, and quarterly basis.
Qualified users will be allowed access to the
system during sign-on via unique passwords. Access to
specific conversations will be limited to those
individuals possessing an appropriate Special Mainte-
nance Qualification code. Classified data will not be
processed by NALCOMIS/OMA.
Various failure contingencies are required for
NALCOMIS/OMA. Squadrons must be provided with alterna-
tive methods for data collection and processing in case
the system unexpectedly goes down. Such alternatives
might include processing on another computer system or
even reverting to manual methods (paper MAFs).
Although a detailed analysis of contingency procedures
is beyond the scope of this thesis, some discussion is
included
.
NALCOMIS/OMA will be required to communicate with
other systems. One such interface will allow the AV-3M
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system to "process summary information to analyze the
performance of NALCOMIS/OMA organizations." [Ref. 8:p.
27] In addition, similar data reporting to Aircraft
Controlling Custodians and Type Commanders will be
supported. Other NALCOMIS sites, such as IMAs and
Supply Support Centers will also be capable of inter-
facing with the OMA.
The NALCOMIS program manager is Naval Air Systems
Command Headquarters (Project Manager Air-270) and the
Central Design Agency is the Navy Management Systems
Support Office (NAVMASSO) [Ref. l:p. 8-3]. NAVMASSO is
responsible for design, development, implementation,
and life cycle support for NALCOMIS. The NALCOMIS/OMA
contractor is Arthur Andsrsen and Company.
B. NALCOMIS FOR DETACHMENTS SUBSYSTEM—NDS
For aviation detachments serving aboard ships which
are not supported by IMA/SSCs (i.e., LAMPS and VERTREP
detachments), a slightly different automation approach
is necessary. This MIS has been termed NALCOMIS for
Detachments Subsystem (NDS). The major difference
between NALCOMIS/OMA and NDS lies in the direct
communication link with the facility which processes
data (the Data Services Facility) for the AV-3M system.
NALCOMIS/OMA will have that capability while NDS will
not. Maintenance data collection and processing
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requirements within the detachment, however, remain
much the same as those within the squadron.
The SNAP I contract dictates the hardware to be
used for NDS. The hardware tentatively selected for
NDS includes [Ref. 9:p. 27]:
1) The Central Processing Unit [to be] a Honeywell
Personal Computer Advanced Processor with 4 MB of
memory and DPS 6/54 emulation board.
2) Storage media... one 80 MB fixed disk drive.
3) The output devices ... one 132 column 150 CPS matrix
printer and a high resolution monochrome monitor
(color monitor with RGB may be used).
4) Input/Output devices ... one 1 . 2 MB diskette drive.
Design and development of NALCOMIS/OMA is ahead of
NDS. Initial design for NALCOMIS/OMA had been com-
pleted and development had begun when funding became
unavailable in July 1987. Design work on NDS, however,
was just beginning.
It is proposed by NAVMASSO that NDS remain as much
like NALCOMIS/OMA as possible since there are many
functional similarities between the two systems [Ref.
10]. Nevertheless, improvements in design from
NALCOMIS/OMA, such as screen design, are to be incorpo-
rated in NDS where practical [Ref. 11].
NDS is to contain only those essential functions
required for detachment personnel to effectively manage
their maintenance business. Ideally it might be
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thought of as a subset of the overall NALCOMIS/OMA
incorporated on a microcomputer.
The NDS concept is based on the same 10 subsystems
as NALCOMIS/OMA, with only streamlined functions
performed by each subsystem. Exactly which functions
are to be a part of NDS is yet to be determined.
C. HARDWARE COST
Perhaps the most important question regarding the
future of automation at the OMA concerns the direct'.
1
to be taken when funding is once again available for
NALCOMIS/OMA. The cost of the minicomputer hardware
specified by the SNAP contract is estimated at $200,000
per squadron [Ref. 12]. Coupled with the fact that
there are approximately 400 0-level squadron mainte-
nance activities, hardware delivery costs alone
approach $80 million. Due to these and other expected
long term maintenance costs [Ref. 13], there has been
discussion at the Program Manager and Central Design
Activity levels to proceed in one of two ways:
1) Have sister squadrons share hardware. In other
words, rather than placing one minicomputer in each
parent squadron, each minicomputer should be shared
by two (or more) squadrons, or
2) Abandon the NALCOMIS/OMA approach and replace it
with NDS. NDS would, in effect, become Phase III.
Sharing minicomputer hardware among squadrons, if
such an option were to prove technically feasible,
would certainly cut the costs of hardware considerably.
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Of primary concern, however, is the fact that when a
minicomputer goes down, more than one squadron will
have to shift into a contingency mode of operations.
No one is absolutely sure just what the effects of a
system failure will be on a squadron, but it will
present an undesirable situation.
D. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE CONSTRAINTS
In attempting to discover just how current
NALCOMIS/OMA plans evolved, the author was concerned
primarily with two questions. First of all, why is
NALCOMIS/OMA being developed on a minicomputer?
Secondly, why must COBOL be used? These questions were
asked in order to gain a sense of understanding for how
NALCOMIS/OMA had come to exist as it currently does.
NALCOMIS/OMA, in its current form, did not emerge
as the result of one individual's ideas about informa-
tion systems design. Rather, it is the result of the
thoughts of many individuals and groups over an
extended period of time. It also appears that certain
political, as well as design, philosophies have
contributed to the shaping of present plans for
NALCOMIS/OMA.
1 . Standardization
Most simply stated, the hardware and software
constraints placed on NALCOMIS/OMA developers are the
result of attempts at standardization. The SNAP
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contract, under which NALCOMIS falls, "alms to stan-
dardize and integrate the Navy's non-tactical hardware
and software." [Ref. 14:p. 91]
a. Hardware
Consider the minicomputer environment which
is planned for NALCOMIS/ OMA. That particular hardware
was selected as a result of the SNAP contract with
Honeywell. The contract is a binding agreement by
which those involved in the design and development of
NALCOMIS /OMA must live. Contrary to the customary
information systems design and development process,
however, the hardware was selected before the require-
ments were fully known:
During a system design project, hardware requirements
are typically forecasted only after the functional
design of the system has been completed. During the
NALCOMIS development, a preliminary design as well as
a fixed hardware environment were provided as
constraints [Ref. 3:p. 25].
Although there are definite advantages to
standardization in a general sense, determining what
sort of hardware is to be used before requirements for
a system are determined places many constraints on
those developing the system and usually makes those
acting as intermediaries between the developer and user
(e.g., NAVMASSO ) experience many frustrations as well.
Those frustrations may be the result of trying to
design an application which will fit the hardware.
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As currently planned, implementing NALCOMIS
using remote work station terminals means that automa-
tion will be limited to access of a central data base.
No stand-alone capabilities will exist within the work
center itself. Placing SNAP I hardware at the squadron
level also imposes certain other limitations:
1) The number of possible contingency plans which
can be considered is reduced. When the minicomputer
is down, NALCOMIS for OMA is down.
2) Sharing of peripheral devices between work
stations is not possible. When the number of
peripheral devices (such as printers) required for
one OMA is multiplied by the total number of OMAs to
be served by the system, this limitation can greatly
increase the total cost of hardware.
Less expensive hardware alternatives could
prove equally suitable. For instance, perhaps some
microcomputer network would serve the same (or maybe
greater) purpose than a more costly minicomputer.
Strategic planning for a system such as
NALCOMIS isn't easy, however. Long lead times are
required to ensure that the necessary hardware is
available when needed. Another important factor is the
long lead time required for ship alterations [Ref. 15].
Hardware cannot merely be carried on board ship ready
to go. The ship must be modified (holes cut in
bulkheads where necessary, spaces readied, etc.) in
order to accommodate the hardware. Not only does this




Therefore, the hardware constraint placed,
on NALCOMIS was a result of the best information
available at the time such decisions were made. Since
1982, when the SNAP contract was drawn up, technology
has changed tremendously. That rapidly changing
technology continues today. This makes strategic
planning for MIS extremely difficult. Since we can
only speculate what technology will exist in the
future, the only reasonable course of action in
selecting hardware is to choose the best, proven
technology in existence at the time of our planning,
b. Software
The selection of COBOL as the programming
language to be used in NALCOMIS /OMA also comes from a
desire to achieve standardization. COBOL has become
the standard throughout much of the business world:
The widespread acceptance of COBOL stems from the
ready availability of COBOL-trained programmers, and
the considerable body of existing application
programs already written in that language ... Organi-
zations using COBOL as their sole language are not
'locked' into a particular manufacturer's hardware,
since virtually all commercial machines have avail-
able excellent COBOL compilers. [Ref. 16:p. 348]
When considered in conjunction with the
hardware environment selected, COBOL doesn't appear to
be too much of a constraint. Because a minicomputer
and, as a result, NALCOMIS/OMA , lends itself to a MIS
which performs transaction processing, COBOL is perhaps
as well suited as any other language.
30
If NALCOMIS/OMA were being developed to
allow limited or extensive stand-alone computing
capabilities, then we might become concerned about the
selection of COBOL. Some commercially available
applications packages might provide useful capabilities
to maintenance managers. Lotus 123 and other software
packages are already being used to produce management
reports within aviation squadrons (see chapter VII).
Most of the currently available packages
are not written in COBOL, however, and cannot be used
in NALCOMIS--because COBOL is the standard [Ref. 15].
When a suitable application program, but one written in
a language other than COBOL, already exists commercial-
ly, it is not even considered for use in NALCOMIS. One
software developer, interviewed for this thesis (but
wishing to remain anonymous), stated that he would not
hesitate using a commercially available software
package if that were allowed. By finding a suitable
package already in existence one would be taking full
advantage of available resources—and saving money on
unnecessary development costs.
2 . Control Over Squadron Data
One further point concerning the minicomputer
hardware targeted for NALCOMIS/OMA is worth considera-
tion. Selection of a minicomputer with a central data
base allows Aircraft Controlling Custodians and Type
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Commanders greater control over a squadron's data.
While perhaps not apparent at first glance, this is a
monumental change in the way things have been done in
the past.
Greater control over a squadron's data theo-
retically means that those receiving reports can be
assured that the organization is reporting factual
data. In effect, a squadron loses control over what it
reports. For example, when reporting the status of
aircraft (i.e., Mission Capability), the squadron pres-
ently prepares the reports manually. With NALCOMIS,
however, squadron managers can no longer manipulate the
data to be reported.
It might appear initially that the only
motivation a squadron has for manipulating data is to
improve performance statistics—making the squadron
look better on paper. This, however, Is not necessar-
ily the case.
The purpose of a status report, as its name
implies, is to provide upper management with a summary
of a squadron's status (how many aircraft are avail-
able, how many are flyable, etc.). The usefulness of
such a report to upper management might depend somewhat
on the report being reviewed by the squadron before it
is sent out.
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One squadron Maintenance/Material Control
Officer (MMCO) stated that, when manually reporting the
status of his assigned aircraft, he uses his judgement
and experience to determine which aircraft are up and
which are down. If he has the resources (e.g., parts
and workers) available to repair an aircraft in a short
period of time, then he will report the aircraft up.
Why report an aircraft down if it will be repaired
within a half-hour or so?
If data is reported automatically by
NALCOMIS/OMA , then we must wonder if it is painting an
accurate picture of the squadron's readiness posture.
The data would certainly be accurate at the moment that
it was reported, but without applying judgement and
expertise of the squadron manager, it might become very
quickly outdated.
This issue, while political in nature, must be
considered in order to fully understand its implica-
tions. If Aircraft Controlling Custodians and Type
Commanders want a more accurate picture of fleet
performance, then will this gain of control over
squadron data provide a step in that direction? There
are several other things to keep in mind. This type of
automatic reporting system could result in:
1) Performance statistics dropping dramatically and,
as a result, fleetwide revision of performance goals,
and/or
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2) Squadron maintenance managers learning how to work
around the system and improve their performance
statistics
.
While it is difficult to be sure what the full effects
of higher authority gaining greater control over
squadron data will be, it is possible that not all of
the effects will be desirable.
3 . Project Pressures
While plans for NALCOMIS/OMA have undergone
much reexamination already, some of those plans are
still under scrutiny. Changing plans costs time and
money. Therefore, each time an issue such as hardware
selection is readdressed, there may be a cost involved.
As a result, there is a hesitancy by those managing the
project to make any changes in plans.
The feeling among those bearing the pressures
of managing the development of NALCOMIS/OMA is that the
project mv.st be continued as currently planned. A
large amount of money has already been spent on the
current plans for NALCOMIS/OMA and it is, therefore,
too costly to make any major changes [Ref. 15]--an




The purpose of this chapter is to point out some of
the issues which face those managing the development of





How can NALCOMIS provide management support to
squadron maintenance managers?
2) What can NALCOMIS do at the squadron level to
improve mission capability?
3) Should NALCOMIS/OMA be further developed or should
NDS be expanded to meet the needs of the OMA?




ment support" and improving "mission capability." [Ref.
3:pp. 3-4] In discussing these questions, we will
attempt to identify those activities in the OMA which
must be positively affected by NALCOMIS/OMA in order to
benefit from computer technology.
Brookes [Ref. 16:p. 98] points out that, when
defining user requirements, it is "more difficult but
more potentially rewarding [to identify] the opportuni-
ties for a new system to make a major impact on a key
area associated with the success of the business."
Since the OMA is in business to provide mission capable
aircraft, NALCOMIS/OMA should provide its greatest
beneficial impact in that area.
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The third question deals with the direction which
plans for NALCOMIS Phase III will he taking in the near
future. The question of whether or not NDS should be
expanded to meet the needs of all squadrons, and not
just smaller detachments, will be presented by con-
trasting the grand-design and piece-at-a-time design
approaches [Ref. 17:p. 26].
A. NALCOMIS AS "MODERNIZED MANAGEMENT SUPPORT"
This section will attempt to provide insight into
how NALCOMIS can (and should) provide support to
squadron maintenance managers. The value of
NALCOMIS/OMA to managers will be discussed by distin-
guishing between management information systems (MIS)
and transaction processing systems. Decision making in
the OMA will also be examined in order to determine
those key areas which could best be served by
NALCOMIS/OMA.
1 . MIS versus Transaction Processing
A data processing system processes transactions
and produces reports. It represents the automation
of fundamental , routine processing to support opera-
tions... A management information system is more
comprehensive; it encompasses processing in support
of a wider range of organizational functions and
management processes ... Therefore , the significant
issue is the extent to which an information system
adopts the MIS orientation and supports the manage-
ment functions of an organization. [Ref. 18:pp. 10-
11]
Is NALCOMIS for OMA as currently planned a true
management information system or is its purpose solely
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that of transaction processing? It might be quite
useful to examine this issue while keeping in mind what
services NALCOMIS should provide to the OMA in the
future
.
Once again, the stated objectives of NALCOMIS
are [Ref. 3:p. 3]:
1) Improved Aircraft Mission Capability.
2) Improved Aircraft Maintenance and Supply Support.
3) Improved Reporting to Satisfy Navy and Department
of Defense Program Requirements.
4) Modernized Management Support.
In understanding how to plan for a system which
will adequately meet such objectives, it is necessary
to consider how the organization operates internally in
addition to how it interacts with its environment.
King [Ref. 19:p. 132] states that
Both internal and external constraints must be
identified if MIS Planning is to be effective. These
constraints will emanate both from outside and within
the organization.
The most obvious forms of external MIS constraints
are ... reporting requirements and the need for the MIS
to interface with other systems.
Internal constraints emanate from the nature of the
organization, its personnel, practices, and re-
sources ... [many] organizational characteristics serve
to limit the MIS's scope and nature. For instance,
the degree of complexity with which the system is
incorporated may be constrained because of the
limited sophistication of management, the lack of
experience within the management group with comput-
ers, or demonstrated distrust of sophisticated
information systems.
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The external constraints, such as NAMP report-
ing requirements and the ability to interface with
interim and future systems are clearly necessary for
NALCOMIS. Objectives 2 and 3 above address these
requirements quite adequately.
If there exists a conflict between stated
objectives, however, it appears to lie with the fourth
objective (discussion of the first objective follows in
the next section). Modernized management support is
certainly a desirable objective of any MIS.
NALCOMIS/OMA , because of its use of on-line, real-time
computing, might surely be classified as modern. The
amount of management support that it will provide,
however, remains to be seen.
"The on-line, real-time nature of the system
will provide the needed response time to support daily
activities and provide timely information to local
managers." [Ref. 3:p. 4] While this statement is
somewhat general, it is important to realize that
NALCOMIS is attempting to provide management support
through on-line, real-time features. 1
To a great extent NALCOMIS automates existing
procedures. To change the maintenance data collection
-•Some of the reactions that maintenance managers
have had with these features will be discussed in
Chapter V. For now we will limit our discussion to the
activities performed by the maintenance manager and the
information he uses in performing them.
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and reporting procedures that have evolved over time
would be an enormous disruption of the maintenance
effort at all levels. Therefore, it is reasonable to
expect that NALCOMIS will, in many ways, resemble the
existing ( NAMP ) manual system. This does, however,
then cause one to wonder how much better off management
decisions will be because of the new system.
Dickson [Ref. 20:p. 82] says that
When a system provides information to be used in the
managerial decision process, then it is a true
information system. . .A true information system is not
aimed at the processing of data as is a clerical
system. Thus, payroll systems, accounts payable and
receivable systems, and even many inventory systems,
although computerized, are not information systems.
Furthermore, an information system contains informa-
tion, not data; the content of the system output is
not a vast sea of numbers , but conveys a message to
the decision maker.
While an endless number of equally sufficient
definitions may be applied to management information
systems and transaction processing systems, one could
say that NALCOMIS/ OMA fits the definitions of both.
There may be no clear distinction in the case of
NALCOMIS/ OMA. But what could be argued is to what
extent will NALCOMIS/OMA provide management support?
2 . Decision Making in the Squadron
Different levels of the hierarchy involved in
aviation maintenance require different information.
The Aircraft Controlling Custodian and Type Commander
usually require reports which contain very aggregate
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and summarized, data (refined and summarized so that the
data becomes meaningful information). The Commanding
Officer of the squadron, while still interested in
reviewing those same reports, will often require that
somewhat more detailed information be supplied to him.
The Maintenance/Material Control Officer, Maintenance
Chief Petty Officer, and work center supervisors, on
the other hand, sort through much data in order to
obtain the information required to make their deci-
sions .
Generally speaking, the further down the chain
of command one moves, the more detailed the data
becomes. This generality occurs due to the nature of
decisions which must be made at each level in the chain
of command. Data becomes information when, somehow, it
is manipulated so that it becomes meaningful [Ref.
18:p. 9]. This information, then, is used for making
decisions. It follows that, since different types of
decisions must be made at different levels in the
hierarchy, different information is required throughout
the chain of command.
a. Types of Decisions
Lucas [Ref. 21:p. 29] identifies three
types of decisions which are made in organizations:
strategic, managerial control, and operational control.
By examining each of these categories briefly, we will
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be better able to understand how NALCOMIS can help
improve decision making at the squadron level.
The first area is strategic planning in which the
decision maker develops objectives and allocates
resources to obtain these objectives. Decisions in
this category are characterized by long time periods
and usually involve a substantial investment and
effort
.
Decisions that are classified as managerial control
in nature deal with the use of resources in the
organization and often involve personnel or financial
problems. For example, an accountant may try to
determine the reason for a difference between actual
and budgeted costs.
Operational control decisions deal with the day-to-
day problems that affect the operation of the firm.
What should be produced today in the factory? What
items should be ordered for inventory?
Lucas further describes the characteristics
of the information that is associated with the three
types of decisions mentioned (see Table 1) [Ref. 21:p.
29]. Information which is used in making strategic
decisions, for example, is typically "predictive and
long range in nature." Data which comes from sources
external to the organization is often used. Also,
"summary information on a periodic basis [may be]
adequate .
"
Historical information, most often gathered
from within the organization, is used in making
operational control decisions. Lucas also points out
that "the data... must be detailed. Because we are
working with the day-to-day operations of the firm,
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operational control information is often required in
close to real time."
TABLE 1

























As shown in Table 1 [Ref. 21:p. 29], the
information required in making managerial control
decisions takes on characteristics somewhere between
those of strategic planning and operational control.
Some managerial control decisions might call for
detailed information while others may only require
summarized information.
b. Classifying Maintenance Decisions
It might be difficult to classify each
decision made within the OMA as one of the three types
mentioned above. There is not always a fine line
between an operational control decision and a manage-
rial control decision. Some generalization, however,
might be possible.
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Strategic planning decisions, for the most
part, take place outside the squadron. Certainly, most
strategic decision making takes place outside the
maintenance department. Operational and managerial
control decisions, on the other hand, take up a great
deal of maintenance managers' time. Since we are
trying to determine how maintenance managers can best
be provided with management support, our discussion
will focus on operational and managerial control
decisions
.
Managerial control decisions can be thought
of as taking place within the OMA primarily between the
Department Head (Maintenance Officer) and the Division
Officer levels. The Material Control Officer, for
example, might be concerned that the squadron's
operational cost per flight hour for the current
quarter is well above that of the previous quarter. He
may examine numerous factors in trying to determine a
cause for the increase: the type of missions flown this
quarter; the price of aviation fuel; unusual mainte-
nance tasks, etc. Once he is satisfied that he knows
what caused the increase, he can then make a decision
as to what action should be taken (or, to take no
action )
.
Somewhere below the division officers in
the squadron's chain of command, operational control
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decisions are made--those decisions dealing with the
"day-to-day problems" which exist in the squadron. The
Maintenance CPO, for instance, is constantly analyzing
and prioritizing discrepancies (needed repairs or other
maintenance actions). He decides which work center
should receive each discrepancy, which aircraft should
be repaired next, when scheduled maintenance can be
performed--decisions which require constant awareness
of the overall maintenance situation.
Work center supervisors, likewise, must be
aware of the situation within their own work centers.
They must know who is qualified (and available) to work
on a particular discrepancy, what priorities exist
within the work center--how to best employ their
resources
.
The management decisions which take place
within the Maintenance Department, then, are primarily
of the operational and managerial control types. It
would, therefore, seem most beneficial to place the
appropriate amount of development emphasis on ensuring
that NALCOMIS supports those decision making functions.
3 . Supporting Management with NALCOMIS
As we move down the management chain of command
from the Maintenance Officer to the maintenance CPO and
work center supervisor, the need for information
generally changes to that which is more detailed and
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real-time in nature than that which is reported outside
the command. It might prove helpful, therefore, to
examine current plans for NALCOMIS/OMA and try to
determine whether or not those plans are likely to
provide managers with the type of information necessary
to improve their decision making.
a. Managerial Control Decisions
As stated earlier, it is difficult to make
generalizations concerning the information required to
make managerial control decisions. Sometimes the
information is required to.be real time and detailed,
while other times summary information is sufficient.
NALCOMIS/OMA, as currently proposed, will
certainly offer at least some benefits to those making
managerial control decisions. Pre-defined reports
should be received with little manual effort and
hopefully with some greater speed and accuracy. Notice
that greater accuracy implies "less chance for con-
flicting data" and not necessarily "more correctness."
As long as there are human sources of data involved,
there is chance for incorrect data.
One report currently available to manage-
ment is the Not Mission Capable Supply/Partial Mission
Capable Supply (NMCS/PMCS) Report which gives a daily
listing of aircraft which are awaiting parts from the
supply system, the supply documents which requested the
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parts, and the status of those documents. This report
is usually published so that it is available at the
beginning of each morning work shift, and it gives
maintenance managers an overall view of how the supply
situation will affect their maintenance plans for the
day.
One of the greatest benefits of NALCOMIS at
the squadron level will be the interface it will
provide between the Supply Support Center ( SSC ) and the
OMA. Maintenance Chiefs constantly require information
on the status of parts and components which are on
order from the supply support center. By knowing when
these parts will be delivered to the squadron, the
maintenance CPO (and other managers) will be able to
make decisions concerning cannibal ization actions and
schedule commitments. An on-line interface with Supply
should give more timely forecasts of delivery times and
dates. Such an interface, in addition to allowing the
tracking of supply documents, will also speed up Lhc
process of ordering itself.
NALCOMIS must provide reports to the
decision makers which contain the right information
(and in the right format), and its on-line features
must be fast and easy to use. In other words,
NALCOMIS/OMA must provide squadron managers, from the
Maintenance Officer to the division officers, with
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better support than they are receiving with the current
manual system.
b. Operational Control Decisions
As we move further down the squadron's
chain of command— to the maintenance CPO and work
center supervisors—the decisions which are made
require even more detailed, real-time data. These
decisions, once again, are operational control deci-
sions .
Those making the day-to-day decisions will
also have two basic ways of obtaining information from
NALCOMIS: by report (or notice) and on-line. But as
more and more detail is required by these managers, it
will become more likely that pre-defined reports will
not satisfy their information needs.
Very often, data reported up the chain of
command is of little benefit (in its reported form) to
those making operational control decisions within the
squadron. All too frequently, the less experienced
local manager is even unaware of the purpose that such
data will serve. Some reports are viewed more as
unnecessary paperwork than useful reports.
Since the reports generated by NALCOMIS /OMA
will be pre-defined, their value to lower level
management might be questioned. As Beishon [Ref 22 :p.
311] states:
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In a situation where our understanding of how a man
does his job is very limited, it is surely rather
dangerous to make a priori Judgements about the
information he is going to need. Perhaps more
important still, there is a more serious danger
in deciding arbitrarily about the information we
think he will not need and which, in consequence, we
keep from him. Management is still rightly regarded
as a peculiarly human skill precisely because,
although we can aid the manager, we cannot replace
him by explicit sets of rules for action, or even by
mathematical equations. Since we, and to a large
extent managers themselves, do not consciously know
how they reach their decisions or why they make a
good rather than a bad one, we must be especially
careful in limiting or formalising their information
sources. In the absence of specific research
findings in the area It would, on the face of it,
seem more sensible to allow the manager more freedom
to build up his own information system on a trial and
error basis and to study these systems in the light
of their effectiveness.
It is reasonable to expect that maintenance
managers will want (and, in many ways, need) the
ability to examine and manipulate some data in a manner
that will accommodate the ways in which they make
individual decisions. (See chapter VIII for further
discussion on manipulation of data.
)
Since NALCOMIS does not allow managers to
freely create and format their own reports [Ref. 10],
some other way of satisfying their information require-
ments must be made available. In the absence 01 the
capability of creating customized reports, the on-line
capabilities of NALCOMIS /OMA must provide quick and
easy access to the information needed to make deci-
sions .
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B. NALCOMIS AND "MISSION CAPABILITY"
NALCOMIS/OMA will attempt to improve mission
capability in a couple of ways [Ref. 3:p. 3]. First,
through "more accurate and timely processing of data,
the organizational levels will be able to better manage
and take action on the information provided by the
system [NALCOMIS]." Secondly, by reducing "delays due
to awaiting maintenance (AWM) and awaiting parts
(AWP)," a greater aircraft availability (and, thus,
mission capability) can be achieved.
Improving decision making and reducing delays due
to AWM and AWP, while critical to increasing mission
capability rates, are not the only things that informa-
tion technology can do to improve mission capability at
the OMA. It is possible that automation could also
improve productivity at lower levels—particularly at
the work center level
.
It is the purpose of this section to show that
mission capability depends on worker productivity as
well as good decision making. After discussing
maintenance and operational commitments which exist at
the squadron, we will suggest what NALCOMIS/OMA must do
in order to improve worker productivity and, as a
result, improve mission capability rates.
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1 . Maintenance and Operational Commitments
There is a distinct relationship between
maintenance tasks and operational commitments in the
OMA. While operational commitments are usually known
well in advance, maintenance on naval aircraft most
often takes place as a result of the unexpected failure
of some component or subsystem in the aircraft. Such
failures make the management of naval aircraft mainte-
nance difficult and filled with uncertainty.
Maintenance tasks can be classified as belong-
ing to one of two categories: "scheduled" or "unsched-
uled" maintenance. Scheduled maintenance is defined as
"periodic prescribed inspection [or] servicing of
equipment, done on a calendar, mileage, or hours of
operation basis." [Ref. 7:p. C-38] "Maintenance, other
than the fix phase of scheduled maintenance, occurring
during the interval between scheduled downtime mainte-
nance periods," is unscheduled maintenance [Ref. 7:p.
C-44].
Similarly, for purposes of this thesis, we
might classify operational commitments as either
planned or unplanned. Planned commitments are those
commitments which are known well in advance, e.g.,
those which can be worked into a monthly operational
plan. Unplanned commitments are those which are
scheduled on lesser notice. For example, a squadron
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might be called upon to provide tanker support when
another previously committed squadron is unable to
provide a tanker for the mission.
It is useful to think in terms of a simple two
by-two matrix while considering the effects of the
possible combinations of occurrences on the organiza-
tion and its personnel. There are four possible

















In a planned-scheduled situation, both Opera-
tions and Maintenance are operating under the greatest
degree of certainty. Coordination between the two
departments is high, and as a result, missions are
completed and there are minimal pressures on the
organization and its individuals. Unfortunately, this
situation occurs too infrequently.
The unplanned-scheduled scenario presents less
certainty, but the situation is still quite manageable
Through minimal coordination, Operations simply asks
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Maintenance whether or not it can handle the extra
commitment, and a yes/no decision is made. While a
Commanding Officer would prefer to provide air support
any time he is called upon to do so, his decision is
based on how many aircraft are available.
The planned-unscheduled combination occurs most
frequently. (The Maintenance Master CPO in the
squadron visited during research for this thesis
estimated that this situation occurs approximately 85$
of the time.) Operational commitments are known well
in advance but aircraft systems fail according to
Murphy's Law. This situation is marked by schedule
pressures and flight cancellations, both brought on by
the uncertainty generated by aircraft going down.
Pressure is on not only Operations to prioritize and
rewrite its flight schedule, but on maintenance
managers and work center personnel to fix the aircraft
as well
.
The last case, unplanned-unscheduled, while
occurring less frequently than the previous case, again
puts pressure on both departments. The maximum degree
of uncertainty involved makes it difficult for the
Operations Officer to decide whether or not he can
accept an added commitment. He does not want to turn
down a commitment that he can possibly meet, and yet,
at the same time, he does not want to commit to a
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mission and then be faced with the embarrassment of
explaining why he missed it after all.
While these mixes of operational and mainte-
nance situations occur in various combinations at any-
one time, it is interesting to note that the most
frequent occurrence, planned-unscheduled, also places
pressure on the organization and its individuals.
Decreased mission completion rates and mission capabil-
ity are the results.
2 . Benefitting From Automation
How, then, should NALCOMIS/OMA , serve to
improve upon the mission capability of the squadron?
Although it cannot directly reduce the frequency with
which aircraft systems break down, it could contribute
to improved management decisions and free workers and
work center supervisors from some of their administra-
tive workload. Besides the importance of making fast,
correct decisions about aircraft maintenance (by
managers at every level ) , the other critical factor
which is necessary to improve mission capability is
worker productivity.
a. Better Decision Making
Providing useful and timely information to
maintenance managers is one of the ways in which
NALCOMIS will contribute to improved mission capabili-
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ty. When managers have the right information at the
right time, they can make better decisions.
As mentioned previously, NALCOMIS must
provide maintenance managers with information pertinent
to the decision at hand when it is needed. If this
information is provided, then NALCOMIS has done all
that it can be expected to do to help in the decision
making process. Whether or not the correct decision is
made will depend upon the decision maker himself.
At the work center level , the work center
supervisor also makes decisions which affect mission
capability. He must decide which personnel should be
assigned to certain Jobs, which discrepancies need to
be repaired next, etc. He must be provided with (or
seek) the pertinent information to make those deci-
sions .
b. Productivity
Worker productivity also influences mission
capability rates. Productivity does not depend upon
information as much as decision making does, though.
The primary factor in determining productivity is
simply how much constructive time workers spend
repairing aircraft discrepancies. Aircraft cannot be
repaired by proper management alone. Manpower is
required.
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Productivity does depend somewhat on
information, however. For instance, time is not spent
very productively, if, in trying to fix a discrepancy,
a worker replaces a component that was not faulty in
the first place. Possessing the wrong information or
interpreting information incorrectly can lead to
decreased productivity. Productivity, nevertheless,
depends mostly on workers spending as much of their
time as possible directly on aircraft repairs.
What sort of activities take workers away
from direct maintenance? While this question was not
addressed in great detail during the research trip to
the OMA , these activities should he identified to
determine what, if any, help NALCOMIS/OMA can provide
in reducing time spent on these activities.
One quite obvious group of activities was
noticed during the visit to the OMA, however. These
activities, which can be termed administrative tasks,
consist, to a large extent, of collecting, documenting,
and verifying data.
The VIDS/MAF, as will be seen in chapter
VI, is one of the current means of collecting data.
Data is entered on the form and checked for accuracy
and validity by numerous individuals throughout the
maintenance department--for each single discrepancy
which is discovered. At the work center level, any
55
amount of time which can be saved in collecting,
entering, and verifying data on the VIDS/MAF can be
spent in the actual repair of aircraft. This could
amount to quite a significant amount of time when the
large number of VIDS/MAFs handled by the squadron is
considered
.
What NALCOMIS must do for the worker, then,
is provide fast and easy access to the system, fast and
accurate data entry, and check the worker's entries for
validity. If NALCOMIS does not provide these services
in a way which is better than the current manual
system, then it is questionable whether NALCOMIS can
significantly improve mission capability.
C. NALCOMIS/OMA OR EXPANDED NDS?
The Navy Management Systems Support Office and the
NALCOMIS program manager (PMA-270) have expressed
uncertainty as to the future of Phase III development
[Ref. 10]. Due to the long-term costs involved in
developing and maintaining NALCOMIS/OMA as currently
planned, the following question has been posed: Should
NALCOMIS/OMA, as currently defined, be further devel-
oped and tested, or should the NALCOMIS for Detachments
Subsystem (NDS) become a basic building block and
expanded as necessary to meet the requirements of
larger maintenance activities [Ref. 13]?
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In this section, the question of whether or not NDS
should be expanded to meet the needs of all squadrons,
and not just smaller detachments, will be examined by-
contrasting the grand-design and piece-at-a-time design
approaches [Ref. 17:p. 26]. Also, some of the criteria
for determining an effective baseline system are
presented.
1. Complexity of NALCOMIS/OMA
During several visits to a typical O-level
maintenance activity, maintenance managers were asked,
"Have you heard of NALCOMIS?" The reply most often
heard was, "Yes, I've heard about it for years but I've
never seen anything on it." While this response is
understandable, the feelings of maintenance managers
toward NALCOMIS were usually one of several commonly
held views:
1) Either they held no strong opinion of the system,
2) They felt that the system is so complex that they
may never see it completed, or
3) They expect to see NALCOMIS at the squadron level,
but perceive the delay as being indicative of some
dreadfully complicated system that will just have to
be dealt with someday.
Almost without exception, however, each individual
agreed that a better way of collecting and handling
maintenance data is needed. Many also felt that a
computer system is the logical choice to handle the
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complex administrative tasks required of today's Naval
Aviation squadrons.
The OMA is unique in that it is, in many ways,
a self-contained unit which carries out not only
maintenance activities, but operational and administra-
tive activities as well. While it is dependent upon
other organizations for support and policy guidance in
each of these areas, it is nonetheless unique.
What this unique structure means is that a
fully integrated MIS for the OMA has the possibility of
being extremely complex. Besides needing information
processing and management capabilities for each of the
individual activities mentioned above, all three
activities must be capable of interacting with one
another to some extent if the OMA is to possess a full
MIS capability.
Even an information system which were to be
limited to only the Maintenance Department would be
very complex by nature. Just as interdepartmental
exchanges of information take place among the Mainte-
nance, Administrative, and Operations departments,
intradepartmental exchanges take place within the
Maintenance Department itself. This potential complex-
ity becomes important in deciding just how much






There are several reasons why a complex MIS
such as NALCOMIS/OMA (as currently planned) might not
be successfully implemented within the OMA all at once.
Besides the users' resistance to change, several other
factors make initial delivery of a basic, no-frills
system an attractive alternative.
1) A complete MIS takes longer to develop than a
system with less capability. The longer development
time of a more complex MIS could mean delays in
delivery of some smaller baseline system to fleet
users
.
2) Delivering NALCOMIS/OMA all at once would mean
that less feedback on the system's performance could
be incorporated into the initial version. While
prototyping would have taken place, it would be
desirable to receive feedback on a baseline NALCOMIS
while other subsystems were being developed and
phased into the OMAs
.
3) Problems would be more easily corrected in a less
complex system. It would be most desirable to have
any problems in the initial NALCOMIS/OMA resolved
before a fully integrated MIS were installed.
Robert Head [Ref. 23:p. 95] states in "The
Elusive MIS" that
Most practitioners agree that a system of major
scope, especially one that cuts across organizational
lines and involves numerous organizational compo-
nents, should be implemented gradually. Rather than
work toward a day several years in the future when an
entire grandiose scheme goes "on stream," it is
better to implement the system in chunks or pieces.
Booth terms these two approaches "the grand-
design approach" and "the piece-at-a-time approach"
[Ref. 17:p. 26]:
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The grand -de sign approach ... can ensure that all
functions and all parts of the system fit together
well. In addition, in-depth analysis of the entire
system prior to implementation ought to minimize the
possibility of surprises--discover ing new require-
ments after implementation has begun, or even after
it is complete.
The piece-at-a-time approach. .. is often. .. appreciated
by system users. System users and their management
generally like this approach because they receive
some payback in system benefits relatively quickly.
They are also less likely to face traumatic changes
as each piece of the total system is implemented. If
changes in operational methods and/or the structure
of the organization are required, it may be possible
to make these modifications gradually.
Booth also states that "the piece-at-a-time
approach is particularly advantageous--and the grand-
design approach especially risky" when trying to
implement poorly understood functions, such as those
performed by managers. He concludes that "the proba-
bility of creating a truly successful system may be
higher with this method [the piece-at-a-time approach]
than with the grand-design approach."
3 . Determining a Baseline
Ideally one would hope that NALCOMIS/OMA could
be delivered to the user at the same rate at which it
was gaining his acceptance. Although it would be
virtually impossible to precisely determine this rate,
it would be desirable, particularly in a large and/or
complex system, to develop and deliver a baseline
system first and deliver subsequent subsystems at a
later date. A baseline system is a system which
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performs some set of useful (and satisfactory) func-
tions but which at initial delivery does not perform
functions which are considered less critical to the
maintenance organization. If that baseline system
could be determined, it might not only help users in
their acceptance of the system, but it could also allow
the basic system, with no shortcuts in design, to be
delivered in considerably less time than that required
for the whole system.
Besides lessening the impacts of a new system
on the end user and shortening initial development
time, such a baseline system offers several other
advantages. If, during implementation testing, the
system were found to be unworkable for some reason,
wasted resources would be limited to those of a basic,
no-frills development. In addition, subsequent
subsystems could be developed and delivered while
taking advantage of lessons learned from previous
subsystems
.
If a baseline system for NALCOMIS/OMA is to be
built, then developers will have to answer several
questions in order to determine the most appropriate
subsystems for the baseline system:
1) Which modules must be built first? This would
include any modules which are necessary for the
existence of the system.
2) Which modules are dependent upon or depend on
other existing modules?
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3) Which modules do we strongly desire to include in
our first version of NALCOMIS/OMA?
Parnas [Ref. 24 :p. 312] says that "one first
searches for the minimal subset that might conceivably
perform a useful service and then searches for a set of
minimal increments to the system." He also points out
that
the identification of the possible subsets is part of
identifying the requirements ... [This is] especially
important to government officials who purchase
software . . . they are ioibidden by law to tell the
contractor how to perform his job. They may tell him
what they require but not how to build it. Fortu-
nately, the availability of subsets may be construed
as an operational property of the software.
Although a purely skeletal system might not be
very useful to OMAs , building a NALCOMIS/OMA which
would perform the most basic, but effective, functions
would be useful. Parnas even states that while the
minimal subset is useful, "it is usually not worth
building by itself." What NALCOMIS must be is a
foundation system which can meet today's squadron needs
effectively and be further built upon as those needs
change and even increase.
4. Making NALCOMIS Effective
Brookes [Ref. 16:p. 5] identifies five attrib-
utes which an information system must possess to be
truly effective:
Decision-oriented reporting—meaning that output from
the system is designed to facilitate decision making
by those persons who receive the output.
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Effective processing of the data—indicating that the
checks and controls on input and output are appro-
priate, system timing is meaningful in the context of
the application, and the utilization of the hardware
and software environment is efficient.
Effective management of the data--e.g., requiring
attention to be paid to: the timing of file updates,
the accuracy of input data, controlled redundancy,
the maintenance of integrity once data are stored
within the system, the security requirements while
the data are being used and on disposal, and appro-
priate back-up facilities.
Adequate flexibil i ty--i . e
.
, it is possible to meet
changing needs of the organization because the system
can be updated as new computing technology becomes
available, and can adapt to changes in the behav-
ioural characteristics of those persons associated
with it.
A satisfying user environment—those responsible for
the system's design make sure that the machine-
people interfaces are appropriate for the tasks
involved
.
That NALCOMIS/OMA should possess these attri-
butes, in addition to performing some set of basic
useful services, is in keeping with what was said
earlier in this chapter. NALCOMIS/OMA should "make a
major impact on a key area associated with the success
of the business" [Ref. 16:p. 98]--and at the OMA , that
business is providing mission capable aircraft. In
order to make a sufficient impact on the mission
capability rates, the effectiveness of NALCOMIS/OMA is
key.
5 . Analyzing Current Plans
Will NALCOMIS/OMA, as currently planned, prove
to be an effective system for improving mission
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capability at the squadron level? Now that we have
identified some of the characteristics that it must
possess to do so, how can we decide whether or not
these current plans are adequate?
Since no computerized system exists at the
organizational level , it could be very difficult to
prove or disprove the adequacy of these current plans.
But there is one possible source which might help in
such an analysis--NALCOMIS Phase II.
As stated previously, many of the functions
performed at the OMA are also performed at the Interme-
diate Maintenance Activity as well. While there are
inherent differences, such as schedule pressures, work
environment, etc., there are enough similarities to
make such a comparison useful.
Although the Phase II system is still being
introduced to the fleet, testing of the system software
has been going on since as early as February 1986. In
addition, "prototype operations commenced in August
1986." [Ref. 6] There are, therefore, personnel who
have gained some experience with the Phase II system.
The next chapter contains a summary of inter-
views with some of these individuals. Those inter-
viewed were also quite knowledgeable with respect to
organizational level maintenance procedures and, as a
result, qualified to evaluate some of the Phase II
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features in terms of the OMA. These interview results
will later be used in our attempt to reveal some of the
strengths and weaknesses of current plans.
D . SUMMARY
Many decisions face those involved in the manage-
ment and development of NALCOMIS/OMA . Some of the
issues associated with the following three of these
decisions have been discussed in this chapter:
1
)
How can NALCOMIS provide management support to
squadron maintenance managers?
2) What can NALCOMIS do at the squadron level to
improve mission capability?
3) Should NALCOMIS/OMA be further developed or should
NDS be expanded to meet the needs of the OMA?
If NALCOMIS is to adequately support squadron
maintenance managers, it must provide, in a timely
fashion, information that is useful in making deci-
sions. But different types of decisions are made
throughout the chain of command.
The types of decisions made in an organization can
be classified as either strategic planning, managerial
control, or operational control decisions [Ref. 21 :p.
29]. Within the OMA the decisions are primarily of the
managerial control and operational control types.
Managerial control decisions, which occur most
predominantly between the Maintenance Officer and
Division Officer levels of management, "deal with the
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use of resources in the organization and often involve
personnel or financial problems." Some of these
decisions require detailed, real-time information,
while others require less timely, summary information.
Operational control decisions, on the other hand,
"deal with the day-to-day problems that affect the
operation of [the squadron]." These decisions usually
require detailed information which is closer to real-
time .
NALCOMIS primarily supports reporting of informa-
tion to higher levels of authority. Since this
information is often of limited value to squadron
managers, and because current plans for NALCOMIS /OMA
will not allow managers to create customized reports
[Ref. 10], some other feature of the system must allow
decision makers fast, easy access to the information
which is needed. If customized reports cannot be
provided, then the on-line retrieval of this informa-
tion must be made available.
NALCOMIS/ OMA will attempt to improve mission
capability through "more accurate and timely processing
of data" and by reducing "delays due to awaiting
maintenance (AWM) and awaiting parts (AWP)." [Ref. 3:p.
3] There is another factor which determines mission
capability, however--worker productivity. If
NALCOMIS/OMA can contribute to relieving some of the
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administrative burden at lower levels, particularly at
the work center level, mission capability will likely
increase as a result.
NALCOMIS/OMA, however, cannot significantly
contribute to freeing workers from administrative
burden unless it provides a faster means of collecting,
recording, and validating data than the current paper
system. If work center personnel must deal with a
cumbersome, time consuming system of data collection,
then they will be less able to contribute to improved
mission capability by spending more time repairing
aircraft discrepancies.
Finally, five attributes required for an effective
information system were identified [Ref. 16:p. 5]:
1) Decision-oriented reporting.
2) Effective processing of the data.
3) Effective management of the data.
4) Adequate flexibility.
5) A satisfying user environment.
In the following chapters, these five attributes will
become the basis for analyzing the current plans for
NALCOMIS/OMA. After presenting the results of inter-
views with NALCOMIS Phase II system users and other
organizational level maintenance managers, the current
plans will be evaluated to try and determine just how
effective NALCOMIS/OMA will be at meeting its objectives
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V. USER CONCERNS
The previous chapter identified some of the
characteristics that NALCOMIS/OMA must possess in order
to be an effective information system and contribute
toward improved mission capability. It is easy to
evaluate a system which has already been built. But
since we are trying to determine beforehand whether or
not NALCOMIS/OMA will possess those characteristics,
the evaluation becomes more difficult.
Although NALCOMIS/OMA has not yet been built and,
consequently, there are no experienced NALCOMIS/OMA
users, there is one group of users that might prove
very helpful--Phase II users. As previously mentioned,
Phase II is currently being introduced to the fleet.
As a result, there are personnel who have gained
experience with the system during evaluation and
testing.
Since many of the functions performed at the
Intermediate Maintenance- Activity (IMA) are similar to
those performed at the OMA, some of the Phase II users
were interviewed with the hope of gaining an under-
standing of the functions which will be included in
NALCOMIS/OMA. The users who were interviewed were
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especially qualified since they also had extensive
experience in organizational level maintenance.
This chapter contains the results of these inter-
views. After providing a description of the users and
the circumstances under which the interviews were
conducted, a summary of the results will be presented
by specific problem area. Later, in chapter VIII,
these results will be used to determine some of the
strengths and weaknesses of current plans for
NALCOMIS/OMA.
A. THE INTERVIEWS
A three day research trip to NAVMASSO (Norfolk,
Virginia) in October 1987 provided valuable background
information on NALCOMIS/OMA. Since the trip was
limited to such a short period of time, however, very
little time was available for conducting interviews
with Phase II users. Most of the available time was
spent researching current Phase III documents and
talking with personnel who were (and had been) involved
with Phase III plans.
Interviews were conducted with users of the Phase
II system for two main reasons. First, it was hoped
that by gaining knowledge of how the Phase II system
worked, some knowledge of NALCOMIS/OMA would also be
gained. The second reason was to identify some of the
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potential problems that exist in current plans for
automating the OMA.
Ms. Nancy White, head of the Systems Integration
and Documentation Division at NAVMASSO , set up the
interviews. She was asked to provide the most know-
ledgeable persons available who 1) had used the Phase
II system, 2) had extensive experience in organiza-
tional maintenance, and 3) could best answer questions
about potential problems that might be encountered at
the OMA.
1 . Profiles of the Users Interviewed
There were three Phase II users who best
qualified for the interviews. The following provides a
profile of those interviewed at NAVMASSO:
USER A
Rate: E-7
Aviation maintenance experience: 5 years OMA; 7 years
as a work center supervisor at both OMA and IMA; 1
year experience as a maintenance controller
System experience: 1 year Phase II; approximately 60




Aviation maintenance experience: 9 years OMA; 4 years
IMA including work center supervisor; 1 year in
Production Control





Aviation maintenance experience: 14 years OMA
including 9 years as work center supervisor, 1 year
as a QAR
,
and 3 months as maintenance controller
System experience: 7 months Phase II testing and
evaluation; approximately 60 hours experience on the
contractor's Phase III prototype
In addition to these interviews, a fourth user
was recommended by the above three as having excep-
tional knowledge about the Phase II system. Because
this user was assigned to MAG-14 , MCAS Cherry Point, N.
C, it was impossible to interview him in person.
Telephone interviews, however, were conducted with this
user. His profile is given below:
USER D
Rate: E-7
Aviation maintenance experience: 5 years OMA; 3 years
IMA
System experience: continuous Phase II experience
from May 1986 to present
2 . The Nature of the Interviews
It was explained to each subject that the
purpose of the interviews was to learn how the Phase II
system worked. Additionally, users were told that,
through the similarities between the Phase II and Phase
III systems, it was hoped that some insight might be
gained as to how NALCOMIS/OMA might serve to improve
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mission capability and provide management support at
the OMA.
Those interviewed were asked open ended
questions. For example, each was asked to describe how
NALCOMIS Phase II is used, how it compared with the
current paper system, and what major problems, if any,
they saw in the system. Any responses that seemed
especially surprising were followed up with more
specific questions.
In the months following the initial interviews,
follow-up interviews were conducted by telephone.
These follow-up interviews included questions intended
to clarify earlier discussions, answer new questions,
and verify earlier statements by those interviewed.
B. RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEWS
The interviews revealed a number of common concerns
among the users of the Phase II system. Each user,
fully aware that the research was being conducted in
the area of NALCOMIS/ OMA , discussed only those func-
tions which were common to both Phase II and the
planned Phase III systems. The results of these
interviews, categorized by problem area, is contained
below.
1 . Users' Expectations
Users A, B, and D each independently stated
that the user must know and understand the NAMP . While
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maintenance personnel (including managers) are expected
to know how the NAMP operates, many do not. Often,
maintenance personnel fail to distinguish local
procedures from those which are directed by the NAMP.
Since NALCOMIS is designed with the NAMP in
mind, there are only limited functions that will be
performed. Therefore, a thorough understanding of NAMP
procedures and knowledge of what NALCOMIS is capable of
doing is necessary in order to prevent frustrations
within the organization. Dickson [Ref. 25:p. 4] refers
to this difference between "what is expected and what
occurs" as the "expectations gap."
An understanding of the NAMP and current manual
procedures is also necessary in the event that NALCOMIS
breaks down. Even if the highest degree of reliability
is achieved by NALCOMIS hardware and software, the
organization must be prepared to revert to a paper
system, being fully aware of procedures, information
flows, and how to properly fill out paper forms. These
users felt that, in order to be ready to shift to a
contingency mode at any time, a VIDS board (discussed
in Chapter VI) will have to be maintained and updated
at all times. User B felt that it might be necessary
to maintain a current VIDS board not only within




2 . Ease of Use
Although screens and conversations are designed
with ease of use in mind, User B felt that learning to
use NALCOMIS may present a problem to new users. Users
A, B, and D doubted that, even after NALCOMIS /OMA has
been delivered and in use for a reasonable period of
time, it will be relatively easy to use.
The period of time immediately following fleet
delivery will, of course, be the most frustrating, with
the entire maintenance organization learning and
adapting to the new system. The high pressure environ-
ment of aviation maintenance, coupled with new proce-
dures, will prove most challenging. User A, although
experienced with the Phase II system, was observed
using paper aids in parallel with the system. He used
a list of codes, for example, to guide him through the
necessary conversations.
User D said that "lots of printouts are being
used by people utilizing the system." He cited lists
of codes (e.g., VIDS/MAF codes, job status codes) as
being used quite often. Most alarming, however, was
his statement that personnel are using printouts
"because going to the appropriate menu screens is just
too much time and trouble."
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3- Will the Automated VIDS/MAF Really Save Time?
Each individual user of the system must sign-on
with his own unique password. If Petty Officer Smith
is signed-on and currently working on a task, what
happens if he is distracted momentarily, for example,
to answer the telephone? Another user, Petty Officer
Jones, meanwhile, enters the work center with some
urgent task, breaks Smith's connection, and signs on
himself. Jones is now finished with his task and then
Smith returns. According to User B, Smith must now
sign-on and re-enter the lost data before completing
his task.
Users B and D stated that a queuing problem can
also potentially develop any time more than one user
within the work center needs access to the system at
the same time. Other than finding an available
terminal in another work center, the only alternative
available to users in the queue is to wait on the
current user to finish. With the paper VIDS/MAF
system, however, many different workers are able to
pull the appropriate MAFs from the VIDS board, complete
the paperwork, and move on to the next task.
User D, the interviewee with the most NALCOMIS
Phase II operational experience, noted that queuing is
"our biggest problem. Avionics is our largest work
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center, and, therefore, is most likely to have numerous
personnel trying to update a MAF at the same time."
Even with the individual user, it is often much
faster to pull a paper MAF, make a pen entry, and
replace the MAF. With an automated MAF, however, it is
necessary to take a certain amount of time to log onto
the system and go through the appropriate conversa-
tions .
User A stated that the maintenance control
manager (e.g., Maintenance CPO ) is constantly looking
at the master VIDS board to make his decisions. He has
a major concern with the way in which the system
presents data on screen. He doubts whether the big
picture of maintenance can be as easily drawn from
screen outputs as is currently done with the VIDS
board. Perhaps managers will eventually learn how to
best extract the information that is needed, but he
felt that, as currently designed, much more effort is
required with the automated system than with the visual
paper system.
User A felt that the extra effort required to
gain an overall view of the maintenance situation might
require more personnel in Maintenance Control. He also
expressed doubts that one terminal within Maintenance
Control would be adequate since the maintenance effort
is so dependent on the VIDS board for decision making.
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He thought that as many as three terminals might be
required to allow Maintenance Control to keep up with
all of the information necessary to coordinate the
maintenance effort: one terminal to keep track of and
make inquiries regarding the present maintenance
situation; one for sending mailbox messages (i.e.,
concerning MAF control numbers, priority messages,
etc.); and one for use by the Logs and Records person-
nel. A fourth terminal might even be required if Naval
Aircraft Flight Records (Yellow Sheets) are used in the
maintenance control area (as is done with the current
paper system)
.
4 . Ignoring the System
As mentioned earlier, there are many instances
when a paper MAF system might be faster and require
considerably less effort than a computerized system.
Users A and C were concerned that there might be a real
danger here that personnel will attempt to bypass, or
intentionally ignore, NALCOMIS. Their biggest fear was
that simple discrepancies might not be written up at
all.
The aviation maintenance environment is, most
often, one filled with heavy schedule pressures. Extra
pressure might be added to the situation when one is
faced with the possibility of missing an aircraft
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launch because NALCOMIS is slow or momentarily inacces-
sible .
User A illustrated the effects of such pres-
sures using the following example. Consider what might
happen when the determination is made, just prior to
scheduled takeoff, that drop tanks are required on an
aircraft. If the worker, already under pressure to et
the launch commitment, is unable to find an available
terminal, he might choose to do the job without using
NALCOMIS at all. He may ignore the system rather than
wait on an available terminal, go through all of the
necessary conversations, and finally complete the MAF--
and miss the scheduled takeoff time.
Besides documenting all of the work done on an
aircraft, the MAF serves to ensure that all of the
proper maintenance has been performed so that an
aircraft is safe for flight. Even the simplest
maintenance tasks require that qualified personnel
check the quality of work performed. If NALCOMIS were




Further concern that people might ignore or
improperly use NALCOMIS dealt with security. Fears
were expressed by Users B and C that, for example,
passwords would freely be handed from one person to
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another for the sake of convenience. User B said that
he could envision a situation in which "a list of
passwords is given to one person." For instance, a
work center supervisor might obtain the password of a
Collateral Duty Inspector and Quality Assurance
Representative ( QAR ) , in order to quickly and conve-
niently sign off a MAF.
An additional security concern was that if
users were allowed to choose their own passwords, other
personnel might easily access the system under a false
identity. If a QAR chose something easy to remember
for his password, say a nickname or his birth date,
then someone else with knowledge of the QAR ' s account
(or access to that knowledge) might compromise the
system. User A suggested that a random password
generator could be used to assign passwords rather than
having personnel choose their own.
User C said that the possibility of system
compromise should be a cause for alarm among those
responsible for safety of flight items. After the
occurrence of an aircraft mishap, what are the legal
implications of the new system? It might become very
difficult to prove or disprove claims by an individual
that his password had been compromised. A type of
electronic forgery, therefore, could become a very real
threat and an issue difficult to resolve. Before a
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similar situation arises, it might serve well to





The Quality Assurance division of the OMA , for
tracking and analysis purposes, often relies on
historical data. What will happen when QA needs data
that has been purged from the data base? User A
expressed concern that retrieving the data necessary
for such analyses may be a very time-consuming process.
Will the periodic purging of the NALCOMIS data base
mean that retrieval of such data will seem not worth
the effort to QA personnel? User A felt that, at best,
QA will keep hardcopy printouts and continue its
analysis efforts manually.
7 Management Support
There was a general feeling among the users
that the system does not provide much management
information. Again, this depends upon what data the
individual uses to arrive at his decisions. But User A
felt that some of the subsystems could be cut down in
size, quite possibly in order to make room for more
management information. He perceived NALCOMIS as
containing double documentation (often, the same data
existing both electronically and in paper form) and
unnecessary data.
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User A also stated that some NAMP programs,
such as the Hydraulic Contamination Control Program and
Oil Analysis programs, for example, must still be done
manually. Similarly, there appears to be little
provision for Quality Assurance tracking and trend
analysis, which might take priority, in his opinion,
over existing Technical Publications provisions.
8 . Other Concerns
A problem of less critical nature, but still a
genuine concern, was expressed by User A. Suppose, for
instance, that a portion of the squadron goes on
detachment from the 1st through the 29th of the month.
The detachment, using a paper MAF system, returns with
a high volume of data (on paper VIDS/MAFs) which must
be processed in a very short period of time (for end of
the month reporting). Many hours of additional (and
duplicative) effort would be required for necessary,
historical purposes.
With the exception of planned down time, each
of the users felt that the Honeywell hardware was very
reliable. Prevailing, however, was the feeling that
response time was a "bit slow." In addition, User B
said that printing hardcopy documents on some of the
available printers seemed "very slow."
81
C . SUMMARY
The concepts which are encompassed in current plans
for NALCOMIS/OMA are seen by present and potential
future users as being both necessary and highly
desirable. Automation and the resulting changes in
procedures are viewed as worth the effort. There was a
consensus among the Phase II users and the squadron
maintenance managers who were interviewed that an
automated maintenance system is long overdue.
While the Phase II users who were interviewed have
been intimately involved with development and testing
of the system, and, therefore, will be more knowledge-
able about NALCOMIS than ultimate fleet users, there is
no reason to expect that the system cannot be accepted
by the fleet once these and other critical management
issues are adequately resolved.
While intended as only a brief synopsis of inter-
views with Phase II users, this discussion has hope-
fully provided some insight as to the nature of user-
manager concerns that face the NALCOMIS/OMA. Although
criticisms exist, users appeared patient and willing to
work with the NALCOMIS until improvements are made.
While there is no way to completely satisfy every user
and manager at the OMA , many of the problems discussed
(and others not discovered through these interviews)
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As stated in the previous chapter, squadron
personnel do not always have a clear understanding of
the differences between NAMP and local procedures.
Those with less knowledge about the NAMP may know how
to accomplish their jobs correctly, but do not neces-
sarily know when they are performing a task in accor-
dance with local, rather than NAMP, procedures.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain NAMP
procedures for the collection and display of data
within the OMA. Since a complete explanation of all
NAMP procedures is well beyond the scope of this
thesis, the discussion will focus on the Visual
Information Display System/Maintenance Action Form
(VIDS/MAF). The largest amount of data within the
squadron is collected on this form [Ref. 7:p. 11-3].
After providing an explanation of the flow of the
VIDS/MAF within the squadron, several of the potential
benefits of changing from a paper to automated, on-line
VIDS/MAF are identified and briefly discussed.
A. CONTROLLING MAINTENANCE
The NAMP provides maintenance managers with
standardized procedures which help them efficiently
manage their resources. To assist in doing so, the
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Visual Information Display System (VIDS) was estab-
lished to provide managers with the information
necessary to control those resources while minimizing
paperwork
.
The VIDS is a management tool that provides a graphic
display of vital, up-to-date information on a
continuing basis. The system correlates all aircraft
status information, particularly NMCS/PMCS, flyable
discrepancies, and assigns a relative importance to
each item. The ability to review the overall
situation and determine what resources are available
enables the MO and MMCO , or supervisor, to carry out
their duties more effectively and efficiently. [Ref
.
7:p. 6-2]
VIDS boards are enlarged cardex type pockets for
the visual display of weapon system status. Each
pocket is overlapped by the one above so that approxi-
mately a 3/8-inch strip is visible at the bottom of the
pockets [Ref. 7:p. 6-3]. While the exact set-up of the
VIDS board is left to the discretion of the individual
organization, the NAMP does require that IN WORK, AWM
(awaiting maintenance), and AWP (awaiting parts) status
be displayed by aircraft bureau/side number [Ref. 7:p.
6-3]. Typical VIDS board layouts found in a Mainte-
nance Control are illustrated in Figure 2 [Ref. 7:p. 6-
5].
"That portion of the maintenance organization's
workload devoted to repair, Technical Directive
compliance, and periodic/conditional inspections is the
area in which there is the greatest requirement for
data in depth." [Ref. 7:p. 11-3] This in-depth data is
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collected during the maintenance process on the Visual
Information Display System/Maintenance Action Form, or
VIDS/MAF (Figure 3). It is the VIDS/MAF which is
placed in the card slots on the VIDS board. By placing
the VIDS/MAF on the VIDS board under the appropriate
aircraft, work center, and status (i.e., IN WORK, AWM
,
AWP ) , maintenance managers can obtain an overall view
of the maintenance situation in order to make decisions
as to how best employ their resources. By flagging
each active VIDS/MAF with colored fillers while on the
board, the manager can also see at a glance which
discrepancies place the aircraft in either a Partial
Mission Capable or Not Mission Capable status.
The VIDS/MAF (Figure 3) is a five part document.
Each copy is identical to the other with the exception
of copy 2, which only contains that information found
on the lower half of the MAF. After the MAF is
initiated and Maintenance Control has determined what
sort of action is required, the MAF is separated and
copies distributed as appropriate. A more detailed
explanation of MAF distribution follows in the next
section
.
In addition to the master VIDS board found in
Maintenance Control, each work center is also required
to maintain a VIDS board for those MAFs which pertain
to that work center. As with any duplication of data,
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there exists a possibility that some of the data
contained on the work center board is in conflict with
the master VIDS board. Therefore, the work center must
verify, on a daily basis, that the information con-
tained on the master board is the same as that con-
tained in the work center.
Maintenance Control also maintains, for each
aircraft, an Aircraft Discrepancy Book (ADB). "The ADB
is designed to provide maintenance and aircrew person-
nel with an accurate, comprehensive, and chronological
record of flights and maintenance performed on a
specific aircraf t . . . for at least the last 10 flights"
[Ref. 7:p. 6-7] As will be seen, the ADB provides this
record by containing VIDS/MAFs written against that
particular aircraft. Those VIDS/MAFs contained in the
ADB must also be verified against the Maintenance
Control and work center VIDS boards to ensure accuracy.
During several visits to a typical OMA , maintenance
managers estimated that somewhere between 80-90$ of all
VIDS/MAFs were initiated due to corrective maintenance.
Because there are such a large number of different type
maintenance actions which are recorded on the VIDS/MAF,
and since repairs account for such a large percentage
of the organization's workload, the focus of this
research was placed on discrepancy MAFs--those MAFs
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which are initiated due to a need for corrective
maintenance on an aircraft.
B. DISCREPANCY VIDS/MAF FLOW
Figure 4, taken directly from the NAMP , Vol. II,
illustrates the flow of the VIDS/MAF document within an
O-level Maintenance Activity. The following comments,
derived from the NAMP and a visit to an organizational
maintenance activity, are numbered to correspond with
Figure 4 [Ref. 7:p. 6-8]:
1. Initiates VIDS/MAF
a. Pilot or Other VIDS/MAF Initiator
The pilot, or other maintenance person
discovering the discrepancy, initiates a VIDS/MAF by
filling out the following blocks of information:
A48, TYPE EQUIP--A four-character code that identi-
fies the end item (e.g., aircraft, engine, etc.)
being repaired.
A52, BU/SER NUMBER—The serial number of the item
being repaired. Aircraft, for example, are assigned
a six-digit number.
A58, DISCD--A single alpha character describing when
the need for maintenance was discovered.
DISCREPANCY--A concise, written description of the
discrepancy.
PILOT/ INITIATOR--The name and rate (or rank) of the
individual initiating the VIDS/MAF.
B08 & B12, RECEIVED DATE-TIME—Julian date and time
that the MAF is initiated.
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b. MCPO Assigns the Work Center
By reading or listening to the description
of the discrepancy (and, if needed, discussing it with
the MAF initiator), the MCPO decides which work center
is responsible for the needed repair and whether the
discrepancy places the aircraft in a down status. He
then appropriately completes blocks:
A19, WORK CENTER--A three-character code used to
identify the work center performing the required
maintenance
.
UP/DOWN--The appropriate block is checked to indicate
the status of the equipment.
A59, T/M--A one-character code describing the type of
work to be performed (e.g., scheduled, unscheduled,
etc . )
c. VIDS Board Clerk
The VIDS board clerk completes any further
required information. One such block, MODEX , is a
three-digit, number used locally to identify an individ-
ual aircraft. Modex is also referred to as the
aircraft's side number.
The VIDS board clerk also assigns a Job
Control Number (JCN) which uniquely identifies each
MAF. The JCN includes blocks:
A08, ORG--A three-character code which identifies the
organization
.
All, DAY--The last tree digits of the Julian date
which identify the day of the year.
A14, SER--A three-character, locally assigned serial
number. By assigning serial numbers sequentially,
each JCN becomes a unique number.
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The copies of the VIDS/MAF are separated....
2. Copy 3 Retained on VIDS board
Copy 3 is placed on the master VIDS board in
Maintenance Control and copy 4 is placed in the
appropriate ADB
.
2a. Copy 2 is Delivered to QA
Copy 2 is delivered to QA where it is placed in





Copies 1 and 5
a. Work Center
Copies 1 & 5 are sent to the appropriate
work center where they are placed on the work center
VIDS board. The work center supervisor, in examining
his VIDS board, prioritizes his jobs according to what
discrepancies need to be corrected in order to get an
aircraft up or ready for the next mission. Maintenance
Control, depending on the situation, may direct the
work center supervisor as to which jobs have the
highest priority.
b. Work Center Supervisor Assigns Job
Then, considering such factors as the
physical location of the aircraft, safety considera-
tions, and the time available to work on the aircraft,
the work center supervisor assigns the job to a
qualified maintenance man.
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4 . Assigned Job
The worker, as proceeding with the job, fills
out the appropriate data sections on copies 1 and 5:
ACCUMULATED WORK HOURS—Used to account for man-
hours spent on repairing the discrepancy. Also used
to document that an inventory of tools has been
performed upon return to the work center.
A22, WORK UNIT CODE— Identifies the specific system,
subsystem, or component which is being repaired.
A29, ACTION ORG--A code indicating the organization
accomplishing the work.
A32 , TRANS--A two-digit code which identifies the
type of data being reported
A34, MAINT/L--A single digit (1, 2, or 3) indicating
the level of maintenance performed.
A35 , ACT TAKEN--A one-character code describing the




A36 , MAL CODE--Three-character code which indicates
the malfunction which caused the repair to take
place
.
A39, ITEMS/ P- -The number of items processed (e.g.,
replaced or repaired).
A41, MAN HOURS--The total number of man-hours
expended in order to complete the repair.
A45, ELAPSED M/T--The total clock time (not man-
hours) required for the repair.
B19 & B23, IN WORK DATE-TIME--The Julian date and
time that work is begun on the discrepancy.
B30 & B34, COMPLETED DATE-TIME—Julian date and time
that the repair is completed.
CORRECTIVE ACTION--A description of the action taken
to correct the discrepancy.
CORRECTED BY--Signature and rate of the worker (or
crew leader) performing the maintenance.
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INSPECTED BY—Signature and rate of the Quality
Assurance Representative or Collateral Duty Inspector
who inspects the Job.
SUPERVISOR—Signature and rate of the work center
supervisor. This signature indicates that Quality
Assurance and tool control requirements have been
met
.
5 Document Requisitioning of Parts
If parts need to be ordered, then the worker
obtains supply and status information from Material
Control and records the information on the MAF
.
6 Inserted on VIDS board
The VIDS/MAF is placed under the AWP section of
the VIDS board until the required parts are received.
7 Upon Completion of Job
Upon completion of the job, the worker signs
off the maintenance action, obtains other signatures
(i.e., CDI , QAR ) as required. The work center supervi-
sor checks the MAF for accuracy and completeness and





Copy 5 is retained in the work center until the
Maintenance Data Report (MDR) containing that MAF is
received from the Data Services Facility. Once that
copy has been verified against the MDR to ensure that
the data on each document corresponds, it is destroyed.
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9 . Update Copies 3 and 4
a. VIDS Board Clerk
Once the MAF is signed off by the work
center supervisor and copy 1 is returned to Maintenance
Control, the VIDS board clerk pulls copies 3 & 4 from
the VIDS board and ADB . The VIDS clerk then tran-
scribes the following blocks from copy 1 onto copies 3
& 4:









B19 & 23, IN WORK DATE-TIME





Copies 3 & 4 are then signed under the MAINT CONTROL
block. Copy 3, which now denotes a discrepancy which
has been corrected, is placed in the ADB for the
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pilot's review. Once ten flights have been completed
on the aircraft, copy 3 is removed and destroyed.
b. Logs and Records
Copy 1 is then sent to the Logs and Records
section. The Logs and Records clerk first checks
certain data blocks for accuracy and completeness:
MODEX and A52 (Bureau Number) are checked to ensure
that they correspond.
A22 (WORK UNIT CODE) is checked to ensure it contains
the correct number of digits.
A29, A32, A34 , A35 , A36 , and A39 are checked to
ensure completion.
A41, MAN HOURS, and A45 , ELAPSED M/T, are checked
against the ACCUMULATED WORK HOURS block for arithme-
tic errors.
A48, A52, A58 , and A59 are checked for correctness.
REPAIR CYCLE times are checked to ensure they are
reasonable
.
c. Log Entries Made
Next, the clerk decides whether or not a
log entry is required. If so, then depending on the
type of entry required by the NAMP , he uses the
appropriate data from the following VIDS/MAF blocks for
his entries in the aircraft logbook:
REPAIR CYCLE (dates and times)
DISCREPANCY
A22, WORK UNIT CODE
REMOVED/OLD ITEM section (blocks E08-E52)--If a
repairable component has been removed from an
aircraft (or other end item), this section contains
data specific to that component.
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INSTALLED/NEW ITEM section (blocks G08-G48 )— If a
repairable component has been installed on an
aircraft (or other end item), this section contains
data specific to that component.
The Logs and Records clerk then checks the logs and
records blocks under the ENTRIES REQUIRED SIGNATURE
section and signs the VIDS/MAF. He then forwards copy
1 to the Analyst in QA.
9a. Copy 4 Used by QA/A
Copy 4 is forwarded to QA. By matching this
copy with copy 2, QA is assured that the discrepancy
has been completed. It now uses copy 4 to complete its
collection of data to be used in trend analysis. In
doing so, QA uses the following blocks:
A19, WORK CENTER--A three-character code used to
identify the work center performing the required
maintenance
.
MODEX--A three-digit number used locally to identify
an individual aircraft.
A52, BU/SER NUMBER--The serial number of the item
being repaired. Aircraft, for example, are assigned
a six-digit number.
DISCREPANCY--A concise, written description of the
discrepancy.
CORRECTIVE ACTION--A description of the action taken
to correct the discrepancy.
A35 , ACT TAKEN--A one-character code describing the




A36 , MAL CODE--Three-character code which indicates




PILOT/ INITIATOR—The name and rate (or rank) of the
individual initiating the VIDS/MAF.
CORRECTED BY—Name and rate of the worker (or crew
leader) performing the maintenance.
INSPECTED BY—Name and rate of the Quality Assurance
Representative or Collateral Duty Inspector who
inspects the job.
SUPERVISOR--Name and rate of the work center super-
visor .
All, DAY—The last tree digits of the Julian date
which identify the day of the year.
a. QAR Receives and Checks Copy 4
When copy 4 is received, QA looks first at
block A19 to determine which QAR should receive the
MAF. That QAR then enters the appropriate data on a
trend sheet which he uses to track discrepancies which
fall under his area of expertise. The trend sheet is
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
The QAR also checks the data (such as
blocks A35 & A36 ) to ensure that it is consistent with
the discrepancy and corrective action taken.
10 . Screened by Analysis
The QA Analyst screens copy 1 to ensure that
the MAF is legible and contains no errors. While some
errors escape the analyst, his Job is to minimize
errors before the VIDS/MAF is sent to the Data Services
Facility ( DSF ) for processing. These copies are






As the DSF receives VIDS/MAFs , operators
keypunch all numbered items from the MAF onto tape. A
second operator keypunches the same data for verifica-
tion. Once a MAF is completed it is stamped by the DSF
and returned to the QA Analyst. Daily reports, called
Maintenance Data Reports (MDRs), are sent to the
squadron, where they are distributed to work centers
for verification against copy 5 of the VIDS/MAF. Any
corrections to the MDR are annotated and the MDR is
returned to the DSF to be keypunched once again.
12. Filed
Copy 1, once fully completed and keypunched, is
then kept in a historical file within the squadron in
accordance with the NAMP , usually for a period of six
months
.
C. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF AN ON-LINE VIDS/MAF
Upon study of the flow of the VIDS/MAF within the
OMA, several potential advantages of an on-line system
become apparent. Some of those advantages are:
1 . Reduction of Lost Paperwork
It was noted by the VIDS board clerk in the
squadron that sometimes copies of a MAF were lost,
leading to either an extensive search for the paperwork
or the tedious reconstruction of that copy. While data
can certainly be lost in a computerized system, there
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are advantages to the elimination of a five part
document and the multiple distribution of those copies.
2
.
Elimination of the Physical Delivery of
VIDS/MAF Copies
Delivery of paperwork throughout the department
means that someone has to take time to walk into
Maintenance Control, receive the MAF, and then return
to his work center. While no time studies were
conducted in this regard, there may be substantial
savings to be had in this area.
3. Reduction of Entry Errors
Maintenance personnel reported that whenever an
error was caught on a VIDS/MAF, time would often be
required to track down the individual making the error
in order to clarify his intended entry. Numerous
fields on the MAF contain only a fixed number of
possible valid entries. For example, a squadron is
only assigned X number of aircraft at any one time.
Therefore, there are only X number of valid entries for
Bureau Number and Modex. An on-line system containing
a module (specific to the type of aircraft operated by
the squadron) might alert the user that he had made an
error, allowing him to correct his entry on the spot.
4
.
Automatic Verification of Data
As illustrated in the previous section on
VIDS/MAF flow, there are many people actively involved
in validating data. The master VIDS board, work center
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VIDS board, and the ADB must all contain the same data
and, therefore, must be validated on a regular basis.
Furthermore, the Logs and Records clerk and QA Analyst
spend much of their time validating the VIDS/MAF for
accuracy and completeness. A computer system capable
of verifying these items would save many man-hours over
a period of time.
5
.
Reduction in the Handling of Data
Outside the squadron, the Data Services
Facility devotes much time to the double entry and
correction of VIDS/MAF data, and the creation of
reports which are provided to the squadron. If such
corrections and reports were done at the squadron level
(primarily on the computer), then the processing of the




Elimination or Reduction of a Number of
Reporting Delays
A computerized, on-line VIDS/MAF could signifi-
cantly reduce delays in reporting. If the input of
data could take place exclusively at the OMA, then the
time required to keypunch and verify data at the Data
Services Facility would be eliminated. Also, reports
could be made available to local managers more quickly






Possible Reduction of Requirements for Space In
Which to Store Paper Forms
The storage of paper forms (blank and com-
pleted) takes up great amounts of space in the OMA. By
storing forms and information on magnetic media, great
savings in space is possible. These savings could
prove particularly beneficial to aviation units when
deployed aboard ship.
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VII . LOCAL AND NON-NAMP PROCEDURES
Woolsey [Ref. 26:pp. 55-59] provides an enlighten-
ing account of one often overlooked, yet important,
factor in determining system success--user (bottom-
level management) acceptance. He states that even
though there is a long-held view that top management
commitment is the key requirement for system accep-
tance, bottom-level acceptance is equally as important.
Woolsey tells the story of a "systems czar" who was
called into:
a large midwestern manufacturing company to design,
build, and gain acceptance for a wall-to-wall
production control and reporting system for the whole
plant. He was given virtual carte blanche to do it
any way he wanted, a munificent salary, all the
subordinates he needed, a budget, expected results,
and a deadline. [Ref. 26:p. 55]
As a first step Woolsey 's "czar" sought to find out
exactly why other large systems of similar type had
failed. What he found was that:
whatever the level of acceptance by top management,
the nonacceptance by the troops that had to deal with
the system on a day-to-day basis was the key. More
study showed that invariably the CRT displays and the
listing to be used by the grunts down below were
presented to them as a big surprise with the (usually
implied) understanding that they should take it
because "mother knows best"....
Finishing his homework, he discovered what appeared
to be a common thread among the failed systems. In
every case where failure resulted, when the customary
exercise of "soliciting lower management commitment"
was finished, only the sharpest or most open-to-
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change management was tapped. The reasons are
obvious: (a) who wants to listen to dummies, and (b)
it's always easier working with people who are ready
for change. [Ref. 26:p. 55]
The systems analyst then went about gathering two
supervisors who had gone on record as being opposed to
any new system and "were not exactly mental giants."
After some initial complaining by the two supervisors,
they then proceeded to tell the analyst that "for over
twenty years they had been coming to work an hour early
and sitting down over coffee and scheduling their two
machine groups to try to minimize both setups and
hassle to themselves." After finding out what the
supervisors needed to reduce this hassle, the analyst,
after three tries and much thought, "presented them
with a computer-generated form in precisely the format
that they could mark up in the most effective way for
their scheduling."
By modifying the existing reporting system to
generate this form, making a couple of subsequent
changes to the format as requested by the men, and
delivering the form to the two supervisors daily and in
a timely fashion, the analyst found that production
under the men began to soar. The supervisors, who had
previously resisted any new systems, seemed now to
become disgruntled only if their report was not on
time. Woolsey concludes that this is how systems
acceptance should be.
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Woolsey's argument can be aptly applied to the
NALCOMIS/OMA concept as well. A visit to an OMA
revealed that managers at all levels within the
organization used reports as tools in accomplishing
their work. While higher-level managers like the
Commanding Officer and department heads tended to use
summary reports, such as AV-3M reports, lower-level
managers tended to use more customized, local reports.
The purpose of this chapter is to show that, no
matter how streamlined the initial version of
NALCOMIS/OMA may be, it should provide managers with
the ability to sort and format data in a way that is
useful to them (as individual decision makers).
Furthermore, managers should be able to easily change
the format of such reports and have them available on
an as needed basis (for example, daily or at the start
of each shift )
.
A. MANAGEMENT TOOLS
In order to understand the need for such a capabil-
ity, it is important to discuss some of the tools used
by managers at various levels. The following discus-
sion, although the result of study done at one OMA,
serves to illustrate the importance of local reports





The Maintenance Control Shift "Passdown Log"
Used primarily by the Maintenance Chief Petty
Officer (MCPO), the purpose of the Maintenance Control
Passdown Log (Figures 5a and 5b) is threefold:
1) Serves as a reminder of important information to
be passed to the next shift's MCPO.
2) Aids the MCPO in coordinating work centers and
maintenance control
.
3) Used as a general management tool (as described
below)
.
The Maintenance Master Chief Petty Officer at
the OMA visited reported that, although not used by all
OMAs , the passdown log is used by a majority of O-level
activities. By marking in the log as progress is made
on various jobs, the log is used as a minute-by-minute
management tool during the shift. While it contains
much of the same information contained on the VIDS
board, the MCPO can obtain, at one glance, an overall
view of the maintenance effort in order to prioritize
his work.
Set up by aircraft side number (modex), the
status of each aircraft (indicated by UP/DOWN arrow) is
denoted, along with the discrepancies outstanding
against those aircraft. By using colored pens, the
MCPO can highlight each discrepancy which keeps the
aircraft in a Not Mission Capable/Partial Mission
Capable status.
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In prioritizing specific jobs, the MCPO looks
for those discrepancies which are keeping an aircraft
in a down (not mission capable) status and checks the
VIDS board to see which jobs are currently in work.
After all downing discrepancies are worked off, then
the MCPO might prioritize jobs by determining either
which remaining discrepancy is the most difficult to
work off or which aircraft has the most discrepancies
remaining against it.
The MCPO finds it difficult to provide a simple
recurring algorithm to explain exactly how he makes his
decisions. He also freely admits that other MCPOs,
given the same information, might make slightly
different decisions about how best to employ his
resources. The MCPO, then, must be able to select that
data which he feels will help him make the best
decisions--thus , a customized tool such as the passdown
log described here.
The log is also used to make the transition
between workshifts one which is complete and smooth.
If the maintenance department, while ashore, Is working
only two shifts, then the outgoing nightshift MCPO can
also make any written comments intended as reminders
for the incoming morning shift MCPO--for example, any
extraordinary configuration changes or progress from
that night.
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Perhaps most advantageous to the MCPO is the
use of the log book as a customized VIDS which contains
only that information which the MCPO feels necessary to
make his decisions. The MCPO also uses the log to
conduct the maintenance meeting with work center
supervisors at the beginning of his shift—again
proving the value of such a tool to the MCPO.
Finally, it should be noted that other managers
also find such a management tool useful. The Mainte-
nance Officer, MMCO , and others can also be observed
occasionally walking over to the passdown log to gain
an overall picture of the current maintenance effort.
2. The Daily Grind
The Daily Grind (Figure 6), also broken out by
aircraft side number (modex), is used by managers
throughout the organization - the Commanding Officer,
Maintenance Officer, Maintenance/Material Control
Officer, MCPO, etc. Containing various statistics
relevant to each aircraft, it is used to gain an
overall feel for high-time components, phase inspec-
tions, engine times, oil samples, etc.
The grind has been developed in many squadrons
through the use of a spreadsheet program on a microcom-
puter. The MCPO, when using the grind to make his
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maintenance, does so with a great deal of caution.
Although a quite useful tool, the grind is subject to
human error and must be verified regularly to ensure
that the data it contains is correct. If, for in-
stance, the grind incorrectly shows the number of
carrier arrested landings remaining on a particular
aircraft, then the maximum allowable landings on the
aircraft's hook point might be exceeded.
Once again, the grind does not present any
information that cannot be derived from the VIDS board
or other sources, it merely contains data presented
such that it helps the manager make better decisions
more quickly. Additionally, as new managers come into
the organization, the spreadsheet format of the daily
grind can be changed to best meet their needs.
3. The Daily Status Report
While Functional Wings and Air Wings require
reports summarizing aircraft status to be submitted on
a daily basis, the reports that they require vary in
format and actual content, depending on the Functional
or Air Wing Commander's desires. The information
contained in these Wing reports are typically what the
OMA wants the Wing to see. Figures might be somewhat
manipulated out of fear of the Wing attempting to
micromanage the squadron. In other words, these
reports tend to be favorable rather than actual
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snapshots of the activity's maintenance effort. They
are, then, not very valuable to squadron maintenance
managers
.
Almost without exception, however, squadrons
produce, in addition to a Wing status report, a
separate daily status report (Figure 7). The squad-
ron's daily status report contains, not what the OMA
wants the Wing to see, but information which accurately
represents the true maintenance situation in a format
useful to them. Just as the Functional Wing Commanders
request status information in a form that is most
useful to them, squadron Commanding Officers and
Maintenance Officers come up with a status report that
best meets their information needs. Besides containing
basic summary information on aircraft status, such a
report might also reveal the status of primary mission
subsystems , thus becoming useful not only to the
Maintenance Department but also to the Operations
Department
.
4 . Quality Assurance Trend Sheet and Trend
Analysis Report
When a Quality Assurance Representative ( QAR
)
receives copy 2 of a VIDS/MAF, he places it in a trend
book. Then, after corrective action has been taken on
the discrepancy and he receives copy 4, he enters data
from the MAF on a trend sheet (see Figure 8). In this
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occurring which apply to his particular area of
expertise
.
Once data collection for a specific period of
time (e.g., a month) is complete, the QAR can then go
through his trend book and construct a trend analysis
report (see Figure 9) in the format preferred by the
squadron. Interested primarily in recurring discrepan-
cies, he may construct such a report by aircraft,
subsystem, or even by pilot.
Although Maintenance Data Reports (MDRs)
received from the Data Services Facility provide
valuable QA information, QARs find it useful to
construct their own custom trend/analysis reports. In
addition, some items of interest to the QAR are not
found on the MDR (for example, unnumbered blocks on the
VIDS/MAF).
5 . The Monthly Maintenance Plan
Required by the NAMP , the Monthly Maintenance
Plan (MMP) provides scheduled control of the predict-
able maintenance workload for the squadron (Ref. 7:p.
6-12). Although distributed outside the command, it is
used primarily by managers within the command from the
work center supervisor up to the Commanding Officer.
In addition to the minimum amount of information
required by the NAMP, Maintenance Officers often add
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information to it that they feel will help in their































6 . The 3-M Supplement
The monthly 3-M report, which is a summary of
Maintenance Data Reports (MDRs), is supplemented by
this report. Also required by the NAMP , the mainte-
nance analyst assemble the 3-M Supplement from MDR
data to give the MMCO and work center supervisors a
view of man-hour accounting within the organization.
The 3-M Supplement can also reveal whether or not work
center supervisors are correctly documenting man-hours
within their work centers.
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In the OMA visited during research for this
thesis, the Analyst was found to be using a microcom-
puter software package (LOTUS 123) to produce graphs
included in the Supplement showing how the squadron
compared with other Pacific fleet squadrons in the
areas of:
1) Mission Capability
2) Cannibalizations/100 Flight Hours
3) No. Defects/100 Flight Hours
4) Aircraft Utilization
5) Corrosion Control/Treatment
6) Equipment In Service Hours
Although this discussion has been limited to
just a few examples of reports being used for manage-
ment within the squadron, there were other customized
reports being used by this command. According to the
Maintenance Master Chief Petty Officer of the squadron
visited, other squadrons also use such customized aids
These and other tools, while extracted from data that
already exists in some other form in the squadron, are
assembled by time-consuming manual methods with
occasional help from microcomputer programs. By
allowing the manager to manipulate data and format
reports according to local needs, NALCOMIS can save
those involved with such reports much time and effort-
time and effort which equates to greater productivity.
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B. THE INTERCOM SYSTEM
Senn [Ref. 27:p. 16] points out the importance of
recognizing informal channels and critical communica-
tion links within an organization when designing
information systems. One very important element that
exists at the O-level maintenance activity is the
intercom system.
The MMCO in the squadron visited during research
stated that every OMA u. el an intercom system. The
master unit is located in maintenance control with a
slave unit in each work center. There is also an
additional slave unit located in the squadron's
operations duty office (see Figure 10). In this
particular OMA, the master unit is capable of ccmmuni-
cating with any slave unit, but each slave unit may
only communicate with the master unit in maintenance
control
.
The type of communication taking place between the
Operations Department (the duty officer) and mainte-
nance control varies somewhat between ship and shore
operations. This difference is mainly due to the fact
that, while shore based, the duty officer is usually in
communication with the pilot. When aboard ship, there
is usually no radio link between the duty officer and























status of the aircraft, cannot always be passed from
the duty officer to maintenance control.
Information which gets passed back and forth from
maintenance control to the work centers, however, does
not change significantly when changing from ship to
shore operations. While no study was conducted with
regard to the volume and type of exchanges between
maintenance control and work centers, the MMCO indi-
cated that the intercom system was "an extremely
valuable tool which is used constantly. We couldn't
get along without it."
The maintenance chief petty officer (MCPO) and
those assisting him within maintenance control use the
intercom to gain information necessary to make minute-
by-minute decisions. A quick call to a work center can
provide the real time status of a particular job.
Another call to the work center supervisor can reveal
to the MCPO which individuals are available (and
qualified) to perform a specific task. The MCPO can
often quickly locate an individual or piece of equip-
ment by calling all work centers at once.
While the intercom may not be considered when
referring to NALCOMIS/OMA , it will continue to play a
role in squadron decision making. The intercom will
become, although not in a formal sense, a part of
NALCOMIS/OMA. As will be shown in the next chapter,
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this communication tool between maintenance control and
work centers should be considered when deciding which
functions of the OMA to automate.
C. NALCOMIS/OMA AND LOCAL REPORTING
Plans for NALCOMIS/OMA do not include any capabili-
ties for creating reports at the squadron level. It
will be possible to generate predefined reports to be
sent to the Type Commander, Functional Wing, or even
the squadron. However, it will not be possible for a
maintenance manager within the squadron to create new
reports
.
There are several reasons why providing local
managers with the ability to create reports might
appear undesirable to those managing the development of
NALCOMIS/OMA:
1) Providing such capabilities could increase
development time and cost.
2) Someone would have to maintain the software
modules which are responsible for formatting and
producing the reports [Ref. 11].
3) Data base integrity could be Jeopardized. If a
user became too knowledgeable in learning how to
manipulate data, he might alter the data base in an
undesirable manner [Ref. 10].
While there is no doubt that providing the capabil-
ity to produce local management reports would take
extra development effort, it is necessary to consider
the benefits of such capabilities to the OMA.
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A brief illustration of the importance of user
acceptance to system success was provided at the
beginning of this chapter. Certainly, providing
features to NALCOMIS/OMA (at a reasonable cost) which
would increase user acceptance would be highly desir-
able. There are several other reasons why automating
local reports would be beneficial.
First, man-hours are already being expended on
collecting data, formatting, and preparing local
reports. The squadron visited in preparing this thesis
was producing such reports both manually and on a
personal computer. While a few examples of such local
reports were given earlier in this chapter, it must be
remembered that valuable man-hours were spent putting
these and other reports together. Management consid-
ered these reports so beneficial that they were willing
to assign personnel in Maintenance Administration and
Quality Assurance to enter data on a squadron owned
microcomputer on a daily basis. NALCOMIS/OMA should be
designed to save the man-hours currently wasted on this
additional data handling.
Secondly, by entering information from, for
instance, a stack of VIDS/MAFS to a microcomputer,
there is a chance that typing errors will occur. Any
incorrect information that ends up on a local report
has the potential of causing an incorrect decision to
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be made. In addition, extra time would need to be
spent in correcting the error, if it's found. Produc-
tivity at every level within the squadron, therefore,
may be adversely affected.
Providing the capability to create custom reports
would also prove valuable to those squadrons which,
upon changing Commanding Officer or Maintenance
Officer, find themselves producing new daily reports.
Each report that is generated manually requires at
least one person to retrieve, produce, and distribute
the report. Any time savings in this area can be
applied to more meaningful tasks.
Providing software modules which allow the genera-
tion of local reports would not have to mean that
maintenance of NALCOMIS/OMA software modules would be
unmanageable. NALCOMIS/OMA could, perhaps, allow the
user to specify the desired fields and format for a
local report. By allowing the format to be saved and
named, the report could be requested as needed by the
user--daily, for example.
D . SUMMARY
Top-level management acceptance is not the only
determinant of a system's success—bottom-level
management acceptance is equally as important [Ref.
26:p. 55]. In order to provide the managers in the OMA
with the information needed to effectively make
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decisions, NALCOMIS/OMA should allow its users to
select and format data to be used in local reports.
Many man-hours are currently expended producing
customized reports for managers within the squadron.
These reports are used to make decisions and are
changed when necessary in order to fit individual (or
group) management styles. In addition, an intercommu-
nication system between Maintenance Control and each
work center aids the MCPO in making his decisions.
While NALCOMIS/OMA is planned to provide some pre-
determined local reporting capabilities, the squadron
is likely to continue producing the other local reports
and management tools mentioned unless the design of
NALCOMIS/OMA incorporates such capabilities. By
allowing squadron users to define and produce custom
reports, they would be better able to effectively
manage their resources.
126
VIII. ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR
THE OMA
Chapter IV presented five attributes required for
an effective information system [Ref. 16:p. 5]:
1) Decision-oriented reporting.
2) Effective processing of data.
3) Effective management of data.
4) Adequate flexibility.
5) A satisfying user environment.
Next, some of the problems that users have experi-
enced (and expect to experience) with the NALCOMIS
Phase II system were identified. The NAMP procedures
currently used in the collection of most of the data at
the OMA were discussed and some of the potential
benefits that a computerized, on-line system has to
offer were identified. Then, the importance of local
procedures and reporting to bottom-level user
acceptance of NALCOMIS/OMA was discussed.
Now it will be shown how these problems and
procedures relate to each of the five attributes
mentioned above. By doing so, the importance of
providing the OMA with local, pertinent, and flexible
reporting capabilities will be established. Each
attribute will be discussed in general and the research
findings applied. In the final chapter, additional
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recommendations for providing managers with useful low-
level reporting capabilities will be made.
As stated earlier, NALCOMIS should "make a major
impact on a key area associated with the success of the
business." [Ref. 16:p. 98] Since the OMA is in
business to provide mission capable aircraft, NALCOMIS
should provide its greatest benefits in this area.
Therefore, it will be shown how the objectives of
NALCOMIS/ OMA can be effective and, in so doing, provide
maximum benefits to the OMA.
A. DECISION-ORIENTED REPORTING
Decision-oriented reporting means that "output from
the system is designed to facilitate decision making by
those persons who receive the output." [Ref. 16:p. 5]
NALCOMIS/OMA should provide the maintenance manager
with reports which are well-suited to aid in his
decision making processes. These reports should be
flexible enough to meet the changing needs of the OMA
and the maintenance manager. They should also provide
the correct amount of information necessary to quickly
and effectively make specific decisions.
1 . Tailoring Information to the Decision Maker
Nichols [Ref. 28:p. 73] states that
The information that is generated and made available
within the organization should be tailored to the
task at hand... The emphasis is upon supplying each
decision point with enough information, of the right
quality, when it is needed.
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But Nichols warns that the information necessary for
decision making does not remain constant. He says that
the information supplied at the decision point ideally
should be changed "when changes [occur] in the
capabilities of the decision-maker, or in the
information made available or pertinent to the
decision, or if the manager responsible for a given
decision [is] changed."
The previous chapter identified some of the
ways in which one OMA uses local, customized reports to
satisfy the needs of its decision makers. Although
several objections to having NALCOMIS/OMA provide such
customized reporting were listed, the importance of
getting the right information to the right person
cannot be overemphasized. It is important to satisfy
the user-manager in the OMA, but it is also necessary
to ensure that better decision making takes place.
If NALCOMIS/OMA does not provide the mainte-
nance manager with the information that he needs, he
will obtain that, or substitute information from some
other source. If NALCOMIS/OMA doesn't provide the type
of local reports currently prepared by naval aviation
squadrons, then the squadrons will continue to prepare
them manually or continue using other, locally devel-
oped computer systems. So, the importance of such
local reports has been established. Although no time
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study was done to estimate man-hours spent preparing
these local reports, the amount is clearly significant.
2 . Satisfying Changing Needs
It is highly desirable (from the standpoint of
the OMA ) that NALCOMIS/OMA provide some custom report-
ing capabilities. In addition, the OMA should also be
able to change the content and format of these reports
relatively easily. Maintenance managers constantly
transfer in and out of the OMA. These same managers
also routinely and periodically change Jobs within the
organization. When a new manager, with a decision
making style different from that of his predecessor,
takes over a position, he often needs different
information than that which has previously been
provided.
It is also important to be able to manipulate
data in order to "convert data into potential informa-
tion relevant to the present and the future." [Ref.
28:p. 74] Since NALCOMIS/OMA (as currently planned)
will not allow maintenance managers to create custom
reports or allow users to download and store private
data bases, such manipulation will have to occur
external to NALCOMIS. Again, if the user perceives a
need for information which NALCOMIS is not providing,
he will obtain that information by other means--and he
may question the usefulness of NALCOMIS.
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3.
Providing the Correct Amount of Information
"Existing computer-based systems often provide
too much data; users frequently have felt overloaded
with information that could not possibly be analyzed."
[Ref. 21 :p. 77] In order for NALCOMIS output to prove
useful to managers , reports and screen output must be
free of information that is not pertinent or which
distracts from other, more relevant information.
4 An Example of Decision-Oriented Reporting
The Maintenance Control Passdown Log, discussed
in the previous chapter, can be used to illustrate the
importance of providing the right amount of
information. The log provides the MCPO with the
information he needs to obtain an overall view of the
current maintenance situation. However, nearly all of
the information contained in the log may be found by
looking at the VIDS board. Although the MCPO is able
to obtain some information more quickly through verbal
communication with the work centers (i.e. the intercom
system), he depends mostly on information contained on
the VIDS board.
Why, then, does the MCPO feel that it is
necessary to duplicate information from the VIDS board
to the log? There are several possible reasons.
First, the log can provide a more recent
snapshot of the maintenance situation than the VIDS
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board provides. For example, there is a lag between
the time that a MAF is completed in the work center and
the time that it is received in Maintenance Control.
But, because the MCPO is in verbal contact with the
work center, he can make an entry in the log which
reflects the fact that the Job has been completed
(noting, of course, that the Job is not actually-
finished until all of the paperwork is completed).
Secondly, and most pertinent to this discus-
sion, the log contains the amount of information that
the MCPO needs to prioritize Jobs and make other daily
decisions. The VIDS board, while designed to provide
managers with a visual representation of the overall
maintenance situation, contains more information than
is needed at times.
By extracting from the VIDS board a list of the
discrepancies which place each of the aircraft in a
partial mission capable or not mission capable status,
and writing that information in the log, the MCPO can
eliminate any information that he uses less frequently
or not at all in his daily decision making. For
example, the MCPO can write a short, plain English
description (typically one or two key words) of each
discrepancy. He can then use different colored ink
markers to distinguish between partial and not mission
capable discrepancies, completed repairs which are
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awaiting paperwork, etc. The MCPO can create a
management tool that contains the information that he
needs to make most of his decisions. He no longer
needs to walk to the VIDS board, lift up the VIDS board
pockets, and read the full description of the discrep-
ancies against an aircraft in order to determine the
status of that aircraft. He can simply glance at the
log, see the list of color coded aircraft discrepancies
in plain English, and quickly become familiar with the
current maintenance situation and any priorities that
have been set.
The Maintenance Control Passdown Log is also a
more flexible tool than the VIDS board. As the MCPO '
s
information changes, the log can be updated. If
aircraft, equipment, or requirements for maintenance
change, the log can quickly and easily be changed as
well. (More will be said concerning flexibility later
in this chapter.)
Finally, the log provides information which is
tailored to the needs of the manager. If a new Chief
Petty Officer takes over the job of MCPO, he can
immediately tailor the log so that it contains that
information which he needs. For example, a new MCPO
may need to list the work center codes alongside (or
above) the discription of the discrepancies in the log.
A more experienced MCPO, on the other hand, may know
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which work centers are responsible for making specific
repairs and may not need to record the work center
information. The log, in effect, can be changed to fit
the style and information needs of the individual
decision maker.
5 . Other Concerns
Other concerns, discovered during the inter-
views with users of the NALCOMIS Phase II system, are
worth mentioning here. Chapter V said that users were
concerned that: 1) NALCOMIS/ OMA might be expected by
users to do more for the OMA than it is designed to do
and 2) NALCOMIS, in the opinion of some Phase II users,
does not provide much management support.
By providing decision-oriented reporting,
NALCOMIS would likely satisfy (or partially satisfy)
both concerns. NALCOMIS/OMA , by putting the right
information in the hands of the users, would be
providing more management support than is currently
planned. Also, those using the information would
quickly come to learn what NALCOMIS can and cannot do
for them. If customized reports could be generated by
NALCOMIS, managers might even benefit in ways that have
not been anticipated by those developing the system.
In effect, the very scope of NALCOMIS could be
broadened by the users themselves.
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B. EFFECTIVE PROCESSING OF DATA
The next desirable attribute of an information
system, effective processing of data, means that the
"checks and controls on input and output are
appropriate, system timing is meaningful in the context
of the application, and the utilization of the hardware
and software environment is efficient." [Ref. 16:p. 5]
NALCOMIS/OMA should allow for quick and easy user
access, automatically verify data as it enters the
system, and process data more quickly and accurately
than current manual methods. Further, NALCOMIS/OMA may
collect or process data into information in ways which
aren't possible with manual methods.
1 . User Access to NALCOMIS
In order for NALCOMIS to improve decision
making and productivity at the OMA , the system must
allow for quick and easy user access. While on-line
features will supposedly provide fast response to user
needs, there are other considerations. As discussed in
Chapter V, some users of the Phase II system were
concerned that, in a hectic operational setting,
NALCOMIS might prove to be slower than the current
manual system.
One major concern is that, with only one
NALCOMIS terminal available in each work center, only
one user in each work center will be able to access
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NALCOMIS at any one time. The only alternative
available to a user waiting to access a work center
terminal, other than to continue waiting, is to try and
locate an available terminal in a different work
center
.
Another concern is that some terminals may not
be used as much as others. Plans call for one terminal
per work center. This somewhat arbitrary placement of
terminals could prove to be suboptimal. For example,
one terminal may not be enough to handle the amount of
use in the avionics work center, while a terminal in
another work center, like ordnance, stands idle a large
percentage of the time.
2 . Speed and Accuracy of Processing
When NALCOMIS/ OMA is installed and running,
will it prove to be faster and more accurate than
current manual methods? If top management is to expect
that NALCOMIS will contribute toward better decision
making and higher productivity (and, thus, improved
mission capability), then it must be faster and more
accurate than the present manual system.
NALCOMIS, as a computerized system, will
process information much faster once that information
is entered at work center terminals. But, in order to
make a useful comparison of computerized and manual
systems, the time required for processing data must be
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looked at in its entirety. Processing must be
considered to start as users begin to log onto the
system and it must be considered to end when users
complete their tasks (or receive output from the
system )
.
Users identified three potential problems which
could negatively impact the speed, and therefore
usefulness, of NALCOMIS/OMA (see Chapter V).
1) Each user must go through sign-on procedures to
gain access to the system. In some instances, the
paper VIDS/MAF system currently in use is faster in
this respect. Under the present system, the VIDS/MAF
may be accessed by simply retrieving the MAF from the
VIDS board, making a pen entry, and replacing the
MAF.
2) If two or more users in a work center need access
to the system at the same time, all but one user must
either wait or search for an available terminal in
another work center. The VIDS board, on the other
hand, allows multiple users to access different MAFs
simultaneously.
3) NALCOMIS may not present data in an optimal
manner. Users noted that the maintenance Chief Petty
Officer, for example, may need to go through four or
five different computer conversations in order to get
enough information to make a simple decision. The
same decision would generally be made faster by
obtaining information contained in a locally main-
tained Maintenance Control Passdown Log.
C. EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF DATA
NALCOMIS/OMA should provide for the effective
management of data. Attention should be paid to "the
accuracy of input data,... the maintenance of integrity
once data are stored within the system [and] the
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security requirements while the data are being used and
on disposal." [Ref 16:p. 5]
1 . Automatic Verification of Data
After tracing the flow of the VIDS/MAF within
the OMA , several advantages of having a computerized,
on-line VIDS/MAF system were identified (see Chapter
VI). One of these advantages, automatic verification
of data, could potentially save many man-hours that are
currently spent manually verifying data for correct-
ness .
The work center supervisor, Logs and Records
clerk, and Quality Assurance analyst spend much of
their time ensuring that information entered on the
VIDS/MAF is correct. In addition, maintenance control
and work center personnel must constantly ensure that
their VIDS boards (and the aircraft discrepancy book)
all contain the same information.
It was also noted that whenever a VIDS/MAF
error was detected, someone (i.e., the VIDS board
clerk) would have to take the time to trace the source
of the error and make the correction. By checking
information as it is entered at the keyboard,
NALCOMIS/OMA will therefore, reduce such occurrences.
As Lucas [Ref. 21:p. 345] states:
A well-designed system handles [input] errors; that
is, it corrects them or notifies someone of the
errors and continues producing valid output. It is
not unusual to find more than half the instructions
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in a program devoted to error detection and handling,
especially in an on-line system.
Notice that Lucas emphasizes the importance of handling
input errors in on-line systems by showing the large




In previous chapters, user identification and
access to NALCOMIS/OMA was discussed. The Phase II
users were concerned chiefly that, for the sake of
convenience, lists of passwords might be freely passed
among NALCOMIS users.
If passwords are freely exchanged among
squadron personnel , then there is a chance that users
will access conversations which they are not authorized
to use. In addition, concern was expressed that, if
responsibilities for maintenance actions needed to be
traced (i.e., after an aircraft mishap), users might be
able to claim that their password, and thus NALCOMIS,
had been compromised.
If adequate security controls are not built
into NALCOMIS/OMA from the beginning, attempts to add
controls later will be very expensive and could prove
to be unsuccessful [Ref. 16:p. 94]. Therefore,
NALCOMIS/OMA developers should be aware of the problems
which have been identified and take action to correct
them.
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Many state-of-the-art system access technolo-
gies (such as devices which recognize voice, retinal,
or fingerprint patterns) offer promising solutions to
security problems but are not part of the current plans
for NALCOMIS/OMA. However, such technologies should be
considered in long-range plans for changes or updates
to NALCOMIS/OMA.
Until more sophisticated technologies can be
feasibly incorporated into NALCOMIS/OMA, developers
should force randomly generated passwords upon the
users. Also, the NAMP should provide clear guidance on
the use of passwords. The establishment of password
lists should be forbidden by the NAMP and supported by
other Navy instructions and inspection procedures
should be established which will ensure that squadrons
are complying with these regulations.
D. ADEQUATE FLEXIBILITY
A system which contains adequate flexibility should
be able to "adapt to changes in the behavioural
characteristics of those persons associated with it."
[Ref. 16 :p. 5] The steady turnover in squadron
personnel means that decision making techniques and
other personal management characteristics within the
OMA will be constantly changing with time.
Flexibility, as we have already pointed out, is
important in achieving user satisfaction with an
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information system. Designing flexibility into a
system can also prolong its useful life, thus reducing
the long-run cost of the system [Ref. 16:p. 92]. So, a
flexible system is not only preferred by the user, it
is also beneficial to the organization as a whole.
As managers learn to use NALCOMIS, they will likely
discover ways in which the system can help them improve
their decision making--ways which may not have been
perceived by system designers. NALCOMIS should provide
flexible services so that managers may take advantage
of such opportunities.
E. SATISFYING USER ENVIRONMENT
A system is said to provide a satisfying user
environment if the "machine-people interfaces are
appropriate for the tasks involved." [Ref. 16:p. 5]
Users must find the system easy to use and it must be
perceived by them as providing useful information and
services
.
The interface between NALCOMIS and users must be
simple and easy to use from the user's standpoint.
These NALCOMIS interfaces generally take the form of
either terminal procedures, screens, or reports. The
term interface, then, describes that part of the system
which the user sees.
The user is important in determining how effective
(and ultimately, how successful) NALCOMIS/OMA will be.
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This is particularly true since NALCOMIS is an on-line
system. As Brookes [Ref. 16:p. 269] says:
Behavioural factors relating to operator satisfaction
with the interface design and overall system logic
are more important in an on-line system than in a
batch system due to the close interaction and direct
penetration of the on-line system into the workplace.
User satisfaction will depend on how well NALCOMIS
can meet the informational needs of decision makers--
decision makers who solve problems in different ways.
NALCOMIS must also present this information in a format
which appears logical to the user. Therefore, NALCOMIS
developers must conduct further research at the OMA to
determine how NALCOMIS/OMA can present the information
in such a way that it suits the decision maker. Local
and informal procedures in use under the current manual
system, such as those discussed in this thesis, must be
considered when development of NALCOMIS/OMA continues.
As revealed in Chapter V, some Phase II users felt
that NALCOMIS was, in some regards, difficult to use.
Some users found that learning to use the system was
difficult. Also, some expressed dissatisfaction with
having to go through numerous menu screens in order to
accomplish certain tasks. Paper printouts were being
used by some because they are faster and easier to use
than the NALCOMIS screens.
Many lessons on ease of use can be learned from the
Phase II system. Phase II system problems in this and
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other areas should be thoroughly documented and, when
development of Phase III is resumed, solutions to these
problems should be included in NALCOMIS/OMA. Recommen-
dations for screen and conversation redesign, for
example, should be a top priority for NALCOMIS develop-
ers so that users will be able to process information
in a shorter average time than is required to process
the current paper MAF.
The fact that the current paper system (i.e.,
VIDS/MAF) might prove to be faster than NALCOMIS caused
some concern in Phase II users who were interviewed for
this thesis. For the OMA user, a faster system might
be perceived as a system which is easier to use. This
perception could lead to a reduction in the level of
user satisfaction. If users become dissatisfied with
the performance of NALCOMIS, they could choose, in
certain instances, to ignore the system.
Those involved with developing NALCOMIS/OMA should
reexamine the currently planned hardware topology for
NALCOMIS/OMA. Time studies should be conducted at the
OMA to determine the frequency with which workers
require access to VIDS information in each work center.
These studies are necessary to determine whether one
NALCOMIS terminal per work center will be enough to
handle the number of workers requiring access to
NALCOMIS/OMA during peak work loads.
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F . SUMMARY
There are five attributes of an effective
information system [Ref. 16:p. 5]:
1) Decision-oriented reporting.
2) Effective processing of data.
3) Effective management of data.
4) Adequate flexibility.
5) A satisfying user environment.
In this chapter, the research findii.g^ discussed in
previous chapters were applied to these attributes in
order to show the importance of providing better local
reporting capabilities in NALCOMIS/OMA.
NALCOMIS, in order to significantly improve mission
capability, must provide the information necessary to
improve managerial decision making and allow users to
quickly and easily use the system. Managers must
receive the information they need, when they need it,
in order to make decisions quickly and effectively.
Workers must find NALCOMIS easy to access and use, so
that they will be able to spend time working on
aircraft and not performing administrative tasks.
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The Organizational Maintenance Activity is in
business to provide mission capable aircraft. If it is
to help significantly improve mission capability at the
OMA, NALCOMIS/OMA must provide improvements in two key
areas: decision making and worker productivity,
a. Decision Making
NALCOMIS/OMA, as currently planned, will
support decision making at the OMA through the use of
predefined reports and on-line screens. The reports
that will be generated by NALCOMIS are primarily
summarized reports to be sent to higher levels of
management. As one moves down the management chain of
command in the OMA, however, the need for information
generally changes to that which is more detailed and
real-time in nature. As more and more detail is
required by these managers, it will become more likely
that pre-defined reports will not satisfy their
information needs.
Providing maintenance managers with the
capability of creating local, customized reports would
require that the developers change their present plan
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for NALCOMIS/OMA. The ability to create custom reports
would ensure that local squadron decision makers
receive the information they need, when they need it--
thus helping to improve mission capability,
b. Worker Productivity
Worker productivity also influences mission
capability rates. In order for productivity to
increase, workers must be freed from non-essential
tasks so that they are able to spend as much of their
time as possible directly on aircraft repairs.
NALCOMIS/OMA, therefore, must provide users with fast
and easy access to NALCOMIS functions, allow for fast
and accurate data entry, and check these entries for
validity. NALCOMIS must provide these services in a
way which is better than the current manual system or
significant improvements in mission capability are
unlikely to occur as a result.
The computerized, on-line VIDS/MAF provided
for by NALCOMIS/OMA can help improve worker productiv-
ity by offering several advantages over the current
manual system:
1) Less lost paperwork.
2) Elimination of the physical delivery of VIDS/MAF
copies
.
3) Fewer data entry errors.
4) Automatic verification of data..




Lessons Learned From Phase II
Numerous problems encountered by users of
NALCOMIS Phase II should be resolved prior to further
NALCOMIS/OMA development:
a. Users' Expectations
Users must have a thorough understanding of
NAMP procedures and the NALCOMIS functions with which
they will be dealing in order to prevent overly high
expectations on the part of the users. An understand-
ing of the NAMP and current manual procedures is also
necessary in the event that NALCOMIS breaks down and





Although screens and conversations have
been designed with ease of use in mind, learning to use
NALCOMIS may present a problem for new users. Even
after gaining experience with NALCOMIS/OMA, some users
may continue using paper forms in lieu of some NALCOMIS
menus and screens.
c. The Automated VIDS/MAF
In some cases NALCOMIS will require more
effort than the current manual system. With an
automated MAF , it is necessary to take a certain amount
of time to log onto the system and go through the
appropriate conversations. Each user must perform
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these logon procedures prior to using NALCOMIS, even
for very simple tasks. A queuing problem can poten-
tially develop any time more than one user within the
work center needs access to the system at the same
time
.
It may be more difficult to understand the
overall maintenance situation from NALCOMIS screen
outputs than is currently done with the VIDS board.
Maintenance managers may feel much less confidence in
their abilities without the presence of a VIDS board in
maintenance control
.
More personnel may be required in Mainte-
nance Control under NALCOMIS/OMA than with the current
manual system. Besides the extra effort required to
see the overall maintenance picture, one terminal
within Maintenance Control may prove to be inadequate.
Since the maintenance effort is so dependent on the
VIDS board for decision making, as many as three
terminals might be required to allow Maintenance
Control to keep up with all of the information neces-
sary to coordinate the maintenance effort,
d. Ignoring the System
On occasion, some personnel may attempt to
bypass, or intentionally ignore, NALCOMIS. Heavy
schedule pressures, compounded by the fact that
NALCOMIS may, under some circumstances, be slow or
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momentarily inaccessible, could mean that simple
discrepancies will not be written up at all. If
NALCOMIS is judged by users as being slower or more
trouble than the current paper system and, as a result,




User passwords could freely be handed from
one person to another for the sake of convenience.
Lists of passwords (e.g., a work center supervisor in
possession of the passwords of Collateral Duty Inspec-
tors and Quality Assurance Representatives) could be
used in order to quickly and conveniently sign off a
MAF. Such practices could make it very difficult to
prove or disprove claims by an individual that his




Retrieving data that has already been
purged from the squadron's NALCOMIS data base may be a
very time-consuming process. Those needing to keep
information for historical purposes, such as Quality
Assurance, will probably keep printouts and continue
using manual information storage and retrieval methods.
g. Management Support
NALCOMIS/OMA may not readily provide
managers with the information needed to make day-to-day
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decisions. NALCOMIS/OMA could be streamlined in some
functional areas in order to make room for more
management information.
The concepts which are encompassed in
current plans for NALCOMIS/OMA are seen by present and
potential future users as being both necessary and
highly desirable. Automation and the resulting changes
in current procedures are viewed as worth the effort.
NALCOMIS Phase II users and squadron maintenance
managers who were interviewed for this thesis felt that
an automated maintenance system is long overdue. There
is no reason to expect that NALCOMIS/OMA cannot be
successfully introduced to the fleet once these and
other critical management issues are adequately
resolved.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the research conducted in the course of
this thesis, the following recommendations for improve-
ments to NALCOMIS/OMA and the need for further research
are proposed:
1. Streamlining NALCOMIS/OMA
The functions of NALCOMIS/OMA should be limited
to those which will contribute toward improved mission
capability. First, NALCOMIS/OMA should provide better
support to local decision makers by allowing the
creation of customized reports and screens. Also,
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special emphasis should be placed on ensuring the
successful implementation of the interface with the
Supply Support Center. Secondly, NALCOMIS/OMA should
reduce the time that workers spend on non-essential
tasks. The time required for users to access
NALCOMIS/OMA should be minimized. An attempt should
also be made to reduce the number of screens and
conversations required to obtain routine information.
2
.
Reporting Up the Chain of Command
Consideration should be given to allowing
squadron Maintenance Officers the option of screening,
and subsequently editing information being reported up
the chain of command. As discussed in Chapter III,





Further development of NALCOMIS/OMA should
include more low-level user involvement. Without the
acceptance of low-level management, NALCOMIS won't be




Learning From Phase II
Comprehensive documentation of NALCOMIS Phase
II development, testing, and user problems should be
kept and applied to further NALCOMIS/OMA development to
ensure that common problems are dealt with in a timely
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fashion. While some parallel development of Phases II
and III has taken place, lessons learned from Phase II





Further study should be conducted to determine
which functions of NALCOMIS Phase II are appropriate
for the OMA. While many of the functions of Phase II
appear to be suitable for implementation at the OMA,
certain environmental differences exist between the IMA
and the OMA. For example, schedule pressures and
operational commitments at the OMA create considerably
different requirements for information.
6 Local , Informal OMA Functions
Further study of local , informal OMA functions
and processes should be conducted in order to assess
their potential impacts on NALCOMIS/OMA. For example,
the intercom system used by squadron maintenance
departments provides maintenance managers with fast,
real-time information. If the intercom system provides
information faster than some portion of NALCOMIS/OMA,
then maintenance personnel will continue to use the
intercom instead of that portion of NALCOMIS.
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS
ADB - Aircraft Discrepancy Book
ADP - Automated Data Processing
AIMD - Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department
AMO - Assistant Maintenance Officer
AV-3M - Aviation Maintenance and Material Management
System
AWM - Awaiting Maintenance
AWP - Awaiting Parts
CDI - Collateral Duty Inspector
COBOL - Common Business Oriented Language
CPO - Chief Petty Officer
CPS - Characters Per Second
DOD - Department of Defense
DPS - Distributed Processing System
DSF - Data Services Facility
HIS - Honeywell Information System
IMA - Intermediate Maintenance Activity
IMRL - Individual Material Readiness List
JCN - Job Control Number
LAMPS - Light Airborne Multi-Purpose Systems
LPM - Lines Per Minute
MAF - Maintenance Action Form
MAG - Marine Corps Aircraft Group
MB - Megabyte
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MCAS - Marine Corps Air Station
MCPO - Master Chief Petty Officer
MDR - Maintenance Data Report
MIS - Management Information System
MMCO - Maintenance/Material Control Officer
MMP - Monthly Maintenance Plan
MW - Megaword
NALCOMIS - Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management
Information System
NALCOMIS/OMA - Naval Aviation Logistics Command
Management Information System for
Organizational Maintenance Activities
NAMP - Naval Aviation Maintenance Program
NAVMASSO - Navy Management Systems Support Office
NDS - NALCOMIS for Detachments Subsystem
NMCS - Not Mission Capable Supply
NRMM - NALCOMIS Repairables Management Module
OMA - Organizational Maintenance Activity
OPTAR - Operating Target
PMA - Project Manager Air
PMCS - Partial Mission Capable Supply
QA - Quality Assurance
QA/A - Quality Assurance/Analysis
QAR - Quality Assurance Representative
SMQ - Special Maintenance Qualification
SNAP - Shipboard Non-Tactical ADP Program
SSC - Supply Support Center
VERTREP - Vertical Replenishment
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VIDS - Visual Information Display System
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